Update: On January 23, 2019, the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed this case as improvidently accepted.

Read the analysis of the oral argument here.

On January 9, 2019, the Supreme Court of Ohio will hear oral argument in the case of State of Ohio v. Ronald Amos, 2017-1778. At issue in the case is whether a juvenile court has jurisdiction to hold a  classification review hearing after a juvenile has been discharged from parole. Justice Fischer has recused himself from the case. Judge Thomas J. Osowik of the Sixth District Court of Appeals will sit in his stead.

Case Background

On January 26, 2010, 14-year-old Ronald Amos was adjudicated a delinquent by the Hamilton County Juvenile Court for what would have been the offense of rape if committed by an adult, and committed to the Department of Youth Services (“DYS”).  He was released from DYS on March 30, 2011, placed on what was then called parole, and classified as a Tier I juvenile-offender registrant. Amos was discharged from parole on June 24, 2013. Then, on July 2, 2014, over a year after Amos was discharged from parole, the juvenile court held a completion of disposition hearing in which the judge ordered that Amos’ initial Tier I classification was to remain in effect, thus continuing his requirement to register as a sex offender. Neither Amos, nor his counsel, attended this hearing.

In April 2014, Amos was indicted and pled guilty to one count of failure to notify the sheriff of a change of address. Then in July 2015, Amos was again indicted for failure to provide notice of a change of address.

Amos filed a motion to dismiss the 2015 indictment on the ground that he had no duty to register because the juvenile court had no authority to classify him after his juvenile disposition and parole had ended. Hamilton County Common Pleas Court Judge Pat Foley agreed and granted his motion. Based on this finding, Amos subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the 2014 indictment also and to withdraw that guilty plea. This motion was also granted. The state appealed both orders dismissing the indictments. The two appeals were consolidated into one for review by the First District Court of Appeals.

The Appeal

In a split decision authored by Judge Penelope Cunningham, in which Judge Dennis Deters concurred, the First District Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the indictments. The appeals court agreed with Judge Foley that the indictments were properly dismissed. When Amos was discharged from parole, he had completed all aspects of the disposition for his sexually-oriented offense, which is when the juvenile court should have held the end-of-disposition hearing, not over a year later. Because the court failed to do so, it lacked the authority to classify Amos as a Tier I offender; thus Amos did not have a duty to register.

Judge Charles Miller dissented on the grounds that the timing of the review did not deprive the juvenile court of jurisdiction. In Judge Miller’s view, “once a juvenile court makes an appropriate classification under R.C. 2152.83, it is permanently vested with jurisdiction to review the classification in accordance with R.C. 2152.84 and 2152.85.” The State based its proposed proposition of law on Judge Miller’s dissenting position.

Votes to Accept the Case*

Yes: Chief Justice O’Connor, and Justices O’Donnell, DeWine, and DeGenaro

No: Justices Kennedy and French

*Justice Fischer not participating

Key Statutes and Precedent

Crim.R. 12(C)(2) (“…The following must be raised before trial: … (2) Defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment, information, or complaint (other than failure to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense, which objections shall be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the proceeding”)

R.C. 2152.83(A)(1)(Initial juvenile tier-classification hearing shall take place at the time of disposition or release from a secure facility.)

R.C. 2152.83(B) (Governs the initial classification hearing: “The court…may conduct at the time of disposition of the child or…at the time of release from a secure facility a hearing…to determine whether the child should be classified as a juvenile-offender registrant.”)

R.C. 2152.83 (D) (Lists factors to be considered in determining whether to classify a delinquent child as a juvenile-offender registrant.)

R.C. 2152.83 (E) (“An order issued under division (A) or (B) of this section and any determinations included in the order shall remain in effect for the period of time specified in section 2950.07 of the Revised Code, subject to a modification or termination of the order under section 2152.84 of the Revised Code… The child’s attainment of eighteen or twenty-one years of age does not affect or terminate the order, and the order remains in effect for the period of time described in this division.”)

R.C. 2152.84 (A)(1) (End of disposition hearing) (Second classification hearing to determine whether initial classification should be ended, modified, or continued shall take place upon completion of disposition, including any probation or treatment.)

R.C. 2152.85 (B)(1) (Timeframe for petition for reclassification or declassification.)

R.C. 2950.07(B)(3) (If the person is a delinquent child who is a tier I sex offender/child-victim offender then the delinquent child’s duty to comply with those sections continues for ten years. If the judge who made the disposition for the delinquent child subsequently enters a determination pursuant to section 2152.84 or 2152.85 that the delinquent child no longer is to be classified a juvenile-offender registrant, the delinquent child’s duty to comply with those sections terminates upon the court’s entry of the determination.)

R.C. 2151.23(A)(15) (“The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction … To conduct the hearings…authorized or required under sections 2152.82 to 2152.86 and Chapter 2950. of the Revised Code…”)

In re Cross, 2002-Ohio-4183 (“when the court ended Cross’s probation, it ended its ability to make further dispositions as to Cross on that count.” The juvenile court loses jurisdiction over the juvenile after it releases him.)

State v. Payne, 2007-Ohio-4642 (A void judgment is subject to collateral attack at any time.)

State v. Palmer, 2012-Ohio-580 (Holding the trial court is within its authority to dismiss an indictment “where the law simply does not apply” and that “[w]ithout a doubt, an indictment is defective if it alleges violations of R.C. Chapter 2950 by a person who is not subject to that chapter.”)

State ex. rel Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch, 2012-Ohio-5697 (R.C. 2152.83 requires that the initial classification must occur when the child is released from a secure facility, not afterward.)

State v. Dawson, 2013-Ohio-4074 (“Even if the juvenile court erred by failing to hold the hearing at the time of disposition as statutorily required, the error is an error in exercising jurisdiction and cannot be collaterally attacked.”)

In re I.A., 2014-Ohio-3155 (Under 2152.84(A), a child classified as a juvenile-offender registrant under R.C. 2152.83 shall receive a mandatory hearing at the completion of the juvenile’s disposition regarding whether the classification continues to be appropriate.)

In re D.S., 2016-Ohio-1027 (It is not a due process violation to impose upon juvenile registration and notification requirements that extend beyond the age of 18 or 21.)

State’s Argument

The juvenile court had jurisdiction to classify Amos as a Tier I sex offender at the July 2014 review hearing because the classification made at the initial hearing remains in effect for the period of time specified in R.C. 2950.07, which in this case is ten years. Thus, without modification by the juvenile court, Amos’ classification should last for ten years. Moreover, because the juvenile court made an appropriate initial classification, it was permanently vested with jurisdiction to review the classification in accordance with R.C. 2152.84 and 2152.85.

The cases relied on by Amos are inapposite because they involved the requirements for initial classification hearings, not review hearings.

Furthermore, though R.C. 2152.84 requires a review hearing “upon completion of disposition,” the statute does not specify when completion of disposition occurs. Instead, the legislature likely meant for the review hearing to occur “around the time” the juvenile has finished the disposition. The legislature could have more clearly defined the timing requirements of the review hearing if the timing requirement was jurisdictional, but it is not.

Additionally, dismissal of the indictments by way of a Crim.R. 12 motion was not proper. Amos should have timely appealed from the classification, not used Crim. R. 12 to dismiss the indictment and then attack the prior guilty plea. Under Palmer, the trial court can dismiss indictments if the law “simply does not apply”. However, unlike Palmer, which involved the application of the wrong version of the statute, the juvenile sex offender classification involved here is much different, and in this context, it cannot be said that the law simply does not apply.  In Dawson, the court found that “even if the juvenile court erred by failing to hold the hearing at the time of disposition as the statute required, the error is an error in exercising jurisdiction and that cannot be attacked.” Thus, under Dawson, Amos cannot attack the juvenile court’s alleged error of an untimely review hearing because that is an error in exercising jurisdiction.

Amos’ Argument

Juveniles are entitled to two classification hearings-an initial classification and a completion of disposition classification. Each has its own requirements. When a statutory time frame is imposed for classifying a juvenile sex offender, the court’s jurisdiction is strictly limited to that time frame, which here was on completion of the disposition. The juvenile court is not, as the state argues, vested with permanent jurisdiction based on the initial classification.

The First District Court of Appeal’s decision should be affirmed for five reasons: (1) the State has waived its proposition of law and other arguments; (2) the trial court’s use of Crim.R. 12 was proper; (3) R.C. 2152.84 contains a jurisdictional timing requirement which governs the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to continue a juvenile’s sex offender classification; (4) the State’s proposition of law would violate constitutional rights of juveniles; and (5) the procedure in which Amos was classified was insufficient.

First, the court of appeals decision should be affirmed because the State’s arguments were never raised below and were thus waived and should not be considered. The only issue on appeal to the First District was whether the trial court erred in using Crim. R. 12 to review Amos’ juvenile record, conclude he was under no duty to register, and dismiss his indictment. Nonetheless, even the State’s Crim.R. 12 arguments should be excluded from consideration because they were not included in the proposition of law accepted by the court for review and they are therefore not properly before the court.

Second, even if considered on the merits, the trial court’s use of Crim.R.12 rule was proper under the well-established precedent of Palmer. In Palmer, the court made clear that Crim. R. 12 can be used to resolve the issues of whether Chapter 2950 applies to a particular person and that a “trial court may dismiss an indictment for violations of Chapter 2950 when it determines that the Chapter’s regulations do not apply to the accused.”  This is precisely what the trial court did in Amos’ case: it found that Chapter 2950 did not apply to Amos, so it dismissed the indictment. This is a proper use of Crim.R. 12.

The third and most relevant reason why the appellate decision should be affirmed is because R.C. 2152.84 requires a review hearing to occur at the time the child completes his disposition. This hearing is mandatory and the timing requirement that it occur upon completion of disposition is jurisdictional. This means that if the hearing does not occur at the specified time, the juvenile court loses its jurisdiction to conduct the hearing and continue the juvenile’s classification.

While it is undisputed that the hearing is mandatory, the meaning of “upon completion of disposition” is contested. The State ignores the timing requirement for the review hearing and would allow a juvenile court to hold the mandatory review hearing whenever it wants. However, the plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous – the hearing must be held at the time the child completes disposition. Disposition refers to the action or consequence ordered by the juvenile court. Therefore, the hearing must be completed at the time the disposition ordered by the court is completed by the child. While the actual disposition may differ for different children—it may be at the completion of probation for some or discharge from parole for others– that does not make the statute ambiguous.

Not only does a clear timing requirement exist, that requirement is also jurisdictional.  As a statutory court, the authority to conduct classification hearings is given to the juvenile court by R.C. 2151.23(A)(15) which is expressly limited to what is authorized by R.C. 2152.82-2152.86. Therefore, the juvenile court only has authority to classify juveniles as provided in R.C. 2152.82-21.52.86 and if the court fails to follow the mandates of those sections, it loses its authority.

In Amos’ case, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to conduct the review hearing and classify him as a juvenile sex offender-registrant ended when he was discharged from parole. Because the review hearing was not completed at this time, the juvenile court lost its jurisdiction over Amos, did not have jurisdiction to conduct the July 2, 2014 review hearing, and the order issued at that hearing classifying Amos as a Tier I offender was void. Thus Amos has no duty to register.

The fourth reason why the appellate decision should be affirmed is because the State’s proposition of law would violate the constitutional right to due process and protection from cruel and unusual punishment, under both the federal and state constitutions.

Lastly, the appellate decision should be affirmed because the juvenile court’s classification procedure was insufficient. For example, even if the juvenile court did have jurisdiction, it was not properly invoked because no motion was filed as required by Juv.R. 35. Furthermore, the juvenile court lacked personal jurisdiction because Amos was never properly served. The July 2014 proceeding cannot qualify as a mandatory review hearing because the juvenile court did not consider any of the statutorily mandated factors in determining whether to continue classification. Finally, Amos’s collateral attack on his classification was appropriate because the juvenile court’s order was void and therefore subject to collateral attack at any time.

State’s Proposed Proposition of Law

Once a juvenile court makes an appropriate classification under R.C. 2152.83, it is permanently vested with jurisdiction to review the classification in accordance with R.C. 2152.84 and 2153.85.

Amos’ Proposed Counter Proposition of Law

A juvenile court is only vested with jurisdiction to impose juvenile sex offender classifications where it has been granted authority to do so by statute. Where a juvenile court imposes a classification under R.C. 2152.83, that classification remains valid up to the child’s completion of the disposition. For jurisdiction and classification to continue, the court must hold a hearing upon completion of child’s disposition as required by R.C. 2152.84.

Amici in Support of Amos

The Office of the Ohio Public Defender along with the Juvenile Law Center, the National Juvenile Defender Center, the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, and Professor Catherine Carpenter, (whose work is on the injustice of sex offender registration and notification laws) filed a joint brief in support of Amos. Each of these amici are committed to furthering the rights of juveniles and advocating on their behalf.  In their brief, these organizations and the Professor argue that Amos was not provided basic due process because the juvenile court held a hearing in his absence, without the presence of counsel, and did not consider any evidence whether the continued classification was necessary. Amici claim that the juvenile court set aside procedural and timing requirements of R.C. 2152.84 and instead improperly based its determination to continue the classification on assumptions.

Amici also stress the severity of sex offender registration requirements which require the juvenile to register personally with not only the sheriff of the county in which the juvenile lives, but also any county in which the juvenile spends more than 3 consecutive days. These requirements are particularly harsh for young people who do not have stable housing and employment. Furthermore, the sex offender label irreparably harms a registrant’s reputation as the general opinion of sex offenders is that they are especially dangerous. However, as the Amici posit, this presumption is false. There is uncontroverted research which demonstrates that individuals who sexually offend as children are unlikely to recidivate. Lastly, Amici explain how registration causes reputational harm, loss of future employment, and other opportunities.

Amici’s Proposed Proposition of Law

The juvenile court’s failure to follow the procedural requirements in R.C. 2152.84 violates a child’s right to due process.

Student Contributor: Ivy Charneski