On September 21, 2021, the Supreme Court of Ohio will hear oral argument in State of Ohio v. Eddie Burns, 2020-1126. At issue in this case is whether a grand jury can indict a juvenile whose case was transferred to adult court on charges the juvenile court determined were not supported by probable cause.

Case Background

On March 7, 2018, Eddie Burns was charged in a 58-count complaint in juvenile court. The complaint contained offenses arising from six different robberies Burns was allegedly a part of between August 2017 and February 2018. The robberies occurred while Burns was fifteen and sixteen years old. During the robberies, eight people were injured, including four elderly persons and four commercial employees.

The State filed a motion to transfer jurisdiction of the case from juvenile court to the general division under R.C. 2152.10(B). The juvenile court held a hearing on probable cause on the State’s motion and determined that the State had established probable cause on all but 15 of the counts. The case was transferred to the general division.

On October 31, 2018, a Cuyahoga ­County Grand Jury returned a 56  count indictment against Burns, largely mirroring the original 58-count complaint in juvenile court. In a plea agreement, Burns pled guilty to ten counts. The parties agreed to recommend a sentencing range between twelve and thirty years in prison. The trial court sentenced Burns to an aggregate sentence of twenty-seven years.

The Appeal

Burns appealed, arguing that the general division court did not have jurisdiction over the counts Burns pled guilty to where the juvenile court found no probable cause. In a unanimous decision authored by Frank D. Celebrezze, Jr., joined by Judges Sean Gallagher and Raymond Headon, the Eighth District, relying on Frazier II, held that R.C. 2152, governing discretionary bindover, does not give the juvenile court the authority to dismiss counts in the complaint not supported by probable cause. Because all the charges in the juvenile complaint were committed during the same course of conduct, R.C. 2152.12 provides jurisdiction to the general division over all counts transferred from the juvenile court, regardless of probable cause findings.

Votes to Accept the Case

Yes: Chief Justice O’Connor* and Justices Fischer**, DeWine**, French***, and Stewart***

* Chief Justice O’Connor would accept the appeal on both propositions of law and would hold the cause for the decision in State v. Smith, 2019-Ohio-1813.

**Justices Fischer and DeWine would hold the cause for the decision in State v. Smith, 2019-Ohio-1813.

***Justices French and Stewart would accept the appeal on both propositions of law.

No: Justices Kennedy and Donnelly

Key Statutes and Precedent

R.C. 2152.12(B) (“[Once] a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is a delinquent child for committing an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile court at a hearing may transfer the case if the court finds all of the following: (1) The child was fourteen years of age or older at the time of the act charged[,] (2) There is probable cause to believe that the child committed the act charged[,] and (3) The child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system, and the safety of the community may require that the child be subject to adult sanctions. . .”)

R.C. 2152.12(I) (“Upon the transfer of a case under division (A) or (B) of this section, the juvenile court shall state the reasons for the transfer on the record . . . The transfer abates the jurisdiction of the juvenile court with respect to the delinquent acts alleged in the complaint, and, upon the transfer, all further proceedings pertaining to the act charged shall be discontinued in the juvenile court, and the case then shall be within the jurisdiction of the court to which it is transferred . . .”)

State v. D.B., 2017-Ohio-6952 (In a reverse bindover case, a case cannot be split in two, with portions returning to juvenile court while other portions remain in the general division.)

State v. Frazier, 2019-Ohio-1433 (8th Dist.) (“Frazier II”) (In a case where the juvenile court determined that the state had demonstrated probable cause for 21 of 28 charges, transfer to the general division pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(B) transferred jurisdiction over the entire case (all 28 counts) to the general division.)

State v. Smith, 2019-Ohio-4671 (8^th Dist.) (A juvenile court did not have jurisidiction to dismiss counts on the basis of a lack of probable cause, and “[o]nce the matter was transferred to the general division under R.C. 2152.12(I), it was within the grand jury’s province to consider and even return an indictment on charges that were not originally filed in the juvenile complaint.”)

Burns’ Proposition of Law Accepted for Review

Because prosecutors must present credible evidence of every element of every offense charged, prosecutors may not criminally indict children on counts for which they failed to establish probable cause in juvenile court. For the same reason, a court errs when it decides that probable cause on lesser offenses equals probable cause for greater predicate ones.

Burns’ Proposition of Law Not Accepted For Review

A categorical bar on filing liminal motions to exclude improper evidence at transfer violates a juvenile offender’s due process right to a fair hearing and to the effective assistance of counsel

Burns’ Argument

R.C. 2152.12 requires probable cause for each act charged. It does not provide a basis on which to indict a juvenile on charges for which the juvenile court found probable cause lacking.

The Eighth District’s interpretation of R.C. 2152.12(B) and (I) creates an inconsistency. The State presumes that R.C. 2152.12(I) permits a prosecutor to indict a juvenile on charges the juvenile court found lacked probable cause, rather than follow the transfer procedure in R.C. 2152.12(B). Subsection (B) is the starting point which provides that transfer from juvenile court is permitted where the juvenile committed an “act” that would be a felony, and there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed “the act.” Subsection (I) governs only the transfer of jurisdiction from the juvenile court to the court of general division. An “act,” as described in (B), is the equivalent to a charge, and “case” in (I) includes only the “acts” in (B) for which the juvenile court has found probable cause. Therefore, only the charges for which the juvenile court found probable cause were able to be transferred under R.C. 2152.12, and thus the general division court only has jurisdiction over the charges where the juvenile court did find probable cause. Unsupported charges are no longer part of the case that is transferred to adult court. A finding of no probable cause ends that proceeding.

The ambiguities in the statute, so far that they exist, should be construed in Burns’ favor to avoid injustice. Essentially, the State’s interpretation reads (B) out of the statute entirely.

Frazier II was incorrectly decided, and the Eighth District has taken itself down the wrong path by following its own incorrect decision.  This Court should reject the view that R.C. 2152.12(I) allows the state to indict juveniles on charges for which the juvenile court has found no probable cause.

Burns also argues that the Court should clarify that R.C. 2152.12(B) does not permit a prosecutor to use a finding of probable cause for a lesser offense (e.g. receiving stolen property) as ipso facto proof that the minor was complicit in the greater offense (e.g. theft of that property). Alleging complicity does not relieve the State from the evidentiary burden in R.C. 2152.12. In order to allege complicity, the State should be required to provide evidence of each element of complicity, especially that the minor “shared the intent” of the principal offender.

State’s Argument

Under R.C. 2152.12(I), entire cases, not individual counts, are transferred from the juvenile court to the general division court. Once a case has been transferred from juvenile court to the general division, the grand jury is permitted to indict on any offenses that fall under the same course of conduct. Under Burns’ interpretation, the juvenile court would be required to split the proceeding into two parts, retaining jurisdiction over one part, and transferring jurisdiction of the other part to the general division.

Burns’ complicity argument is misplaced because the juvenile court did not rely solely on a complicity analysis when making the probable cause findings. The juvenile court’s findings were based in part on complicity, but also on the other factual circumstances of the case.

Amicus in Support of the State

Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost

The Ohio Attorney General (“OAG”) will split time with the State at oral argument. The OAG is Ohio’s chief law enforcement officer, and “shall appear for the state in the trial and argument of all civil and criminal causes in the supreme court in which the state is directly or indirectly interested.”

A juvenile court’s charge-specific probable cause findings have no impact on a criminal court’s jurisdiction. Those probable cause hearings in juvenile court are not adjudicatory hearings. Nor should the juvenile court’s probable cause determination be given preclusive effect. When a juvenile court determines that a juvenile should be bound over to adult court under R.C. 2152.12, it transfers jurisdiction of the entire case,  not a subset of the case. The general division acquires jurisdiction over all charges, whether there was a correct finding of probable cause, an incorrect finding, or no finding at all. The grand jury or subsequent appellate court will vindicate the defendant if there is any lack of probable cause.

Amicus OAG’s Proposed Proposition of Law

An adult court to which a juvenile criminal case is transferred has jurisdiction over the juvenile’s entire case, including any claims with respect to which the juvenile court found no probable cause.

Student Contributor: Liam H. McMillin