On November 23, 2021, the Supreme Court of Ohio handed down a merit decision in Maternal Grandmother v. Hamilton Cty. Dept. of Job & Family Servs. Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-4096. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Fischer, in which Justice DeWine, joined by Justice Kennedy, concurred in judgment only, the Court held that the plaintiff in the case was not subject to a heightened pleading standard, met the applicable notice pleading standard, and could proceed with her case against the caseworkers involved. The case was argued April 28, 2021.

Case Background

G.B. was killed by her parents when she was 2 years old. Her grandmother, Desena Bradley, sued the Hamilton County Commissioners, the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services (HCJFS)(collectively, the county defendants) and the individual HCJFS caseworkers involved in her granddaughter’s care. All the county defendants and caseworkers filed motions for judgment on the pleadings, arguing they were immune from such lawsuits. The trial court granted these motions and dismissed Bradley’s claims with prejudice.

In a split decision the First District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The panel was unanimous that the county defendants were entitled to immunity as a matter of law but split on the claims against the caseworkers. The majority held that the complaint did not set forth sufficient facts to overcome the statutory presumption of immunity. Judge Crouse disagreed and found the complaint to be sufficient regarding the claims against the caseworkers.  Read the oral argument preview of the case here and the analysis here.

Key Statutes and Precedent

Ohio Civ.R. 8(A) (“A pleading that sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which the party claims to be entitled.”) 

Civ.R.9(B) (“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.”) 

Civ.R.12(C) (“After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”) 

R.C. 2151.421(A)(1)(a)  (Reports of suspected child abuse must be made to the public children services agency or a peace officer in the county where the child resides, or where the suspected abuse occurred.) 

R.C. 2744.02 (generally provides public employees with immunity.) 

R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) (Employee-Immunity Statute) (A governmental employee is immune from liability, unless the employee’s “acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.”) 

Conley v. Gibson, 355 US 41 (1957) (“…a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”)

Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190 (1988) (Unsupported legal conclusions are not deemed true for purposes of a motion to dismiss and “are not sufficient to withstand such a motion.”) 

Mussivand v. David, 45 Ohio St.3d 314 (1989) (“It is not necessary that the defendant should have anticipated the particular injury. It is sufficient that his act is likely to result in an injury to someone.”) 

Byrd v. Faber, 57 Ohio St. 3d 56 (1991) (holding that plaintiffs who bring negligent-hiring actions against religious institutions must plead with particularity.) 

York v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143 (1991) (“A plaintiff is not required to prove his or her case at the pleading stage.”) 

Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept., 70 Ohio St.3d 351 (1994) (“[T]he issue of wanton misconduct is normally a jury question.”) 

Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (A plaintiff must plead enough “facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” To prevail, the plaintiff must show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”) 

O’Toole v. Denihan , 118 Ohio St.3d 374 (2008) (A public children services agency and its employees do not have a duty to cross-report the case to law enforcement, and they “are immune from liability for failing to do so.”) 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (A complaint must contain facts, not mere legal conclusions. Further, “threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory statements” are insufficient.) 

Vagas v. Hudson, 2009-Ohio-6794 (9th Dist.) (“A complaint must be more than bare assertions of legal conclusions.”) 

DiGiorgia v. Cleveland, 2011-Ohio-5878 (8th Dist.) (“While a complaint attacked by a motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, the [plaintiffs’] obligation to provide the grounds for their entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”) 

Tuleta v. Med. Mutual of Ohio, 2014-Ohio-396 (8th Dist.) (Rule 8 and Ohio’s traditional “no set of facts” pleading standards were not meant to replace a well-researched and factually supported cause of action.) 

 Grandmother’s First Proposition of Law Accepted for Review

To adequately plead that child-protection caseworkers have lost their immunity to suit, plaintiffs need only allege—consistent with ordinary notice-pleading requirements—facts from which reasonable jurors could conclude that the caseworkers’ conduct was wanton or reckless. Plaintiffs are not obliged to satisfy any heightened pleading standards requiring them to plead with specificity or affirmatively prove the “wanton or reckless” exception to government immunity.

Grandmother’s Second Proposition of Law Accepted for Review

To allege a claim against child-protection caseworkers for failing to adequately investigate a report of child abuse, the plaintiff need not plead that the injury the child suffered was from precisely the same form of abuse that was initially reported and that triggered the investigation.

Does the Court accept Grandmother’s Proposed Propositions of Law?

Yes

Merit Decision

Executive Summary

“When a complaint invokes an exception to a government employee’s immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b), notice pleading suffices and the plaintiff may not be held to a heightened pleading standard.”

Analysis

Generally political subdivisions and their employees are given immunity from lawsuits. But this immunity is not absolute. Employees of a political subdivision are not entitled to immunity if their actions were wanton or reckless. Wanton misconduct is the “failure to exercise any care toward those to whom a duty of case is owed in circumstances in which there is great probability that harm will result.”  Reckless conduct is “the conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to another that is unreasonable under the circumstances.” Both are something more than negligence.

Ohio is a notice pleading state. Other than fraud or mistake, parties need not plead claims with particularity. In this situation, where an employee’s allegedly wanton or reckless behavior is at issue the general pleading rules—not heightened pleading standards-apply.

Grandmother Bradley’s complaint essentially alleges that the caseworkers disregarded or were indifferent to a known or obvious risk of harm to G.B. that was unreasonable under the circumstances. That’s good enough.

While Bradley’s complaint could have been more clearly written, the Court concludes that it was sufficient to put the caseworkers on notice of the claims against them and that they might not be entitled to immunity. The judgment on the pleadings was erroneous and the case against the caseworkers can proceed on remand. To prevail Bradley will need to prove that the caseworkers’ conduct was wanton or reckless. But she need not prove her case at the pleading stage.

Justice DeWine’s Concurrence in Judgment Only

Justice DeWine agrees with the majority that Bradley’s complaint is sufficient under Ohio’s notice pleading standards to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings. He writes separately to further elaborate on Ohio’s pleading standard.

Heightened Pleading Not Before the Court

The only one who raised the issue of a heightened pleading standard was the plaintiff in her proposed position of law. The Court of Appeals did not apply heightened pleading and the caseworkers argued they were entitled to judgment in their favor based on Ohio’s notice-pleading standard.

Ohio’s Notice Pleading

Ohio’s notice pleading, set forth in Civ. R. 8(A) only requires the plaintiff to set forth factual allegations which if proved would entitle the plaintiff to relief. The nonmoving party is entitled to all reasonable inferences.

Ohio’s notice pleading came from the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Conley v. Gibson, which held that to dismiss a complaint at the pleading stage, it must appear “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” But, says DeWine, the “no set of facts” language is not literally correct, because if that were the standard, “even the most cursory complaint could survive dismissal.” And in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the U.S Supreme Court recognized that the “no set of facts” standard was being misapplied and discarded the phrase. Justice DeWine suggests the Supreme Court of Ohio should do the same.  The correct standard to survive a motion to dismiss is for the plaintiff to “supply enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” which means the plaintiff must “plead factual content” that presents “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  DeWine notes that the Ohio high court might want to hold the same but not in this case because it does not squarely present the issue. While the Supreme Court of Ohio has not expressly addressed Twombly and Iqbal, the Court has long held that unsupported legal conclusions are not good enough to survive a motion to dismiss.  Nor is mere speculation good enough to state a claim without operative facts.

Bradley’s Complaint Alleges Sufficient Facts to State a Claim

The caseworkers in this case could be held liable only if their conduct was wanton or reckless.  Bradley had to present factual allegations to meet this standard. DeWine found that much of Bradley’s complaint contained nothing but bare legal conclusions, which were not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.  But DeWine found one aspect of the complaint was sufficient, which was the allegation of G.B.’s admission to the hospital in December of 2014 with significant indicia of abuse. He detailed this aspect of the complaint, and found that these allegations, which he specifically detailed, were sufficient to state a claim for relief. If her injuries were as severe as alleged, the caseworkers should have noticed them on the home visit three weeks earlier, leaving the inference that either no home visit took place or one took place but was inadequate. Thus, with discovery, Bradley might be able to show that the caseworkers were reckless in failing to look into G.B.’s situation after she was discharged from the hospital.

Justice Kennedy joined this concurrence in judgment only.

Case Disposition

The judgment was reversed in part and the cause remanded.

Trial Court Judge (reversed)

Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas Judge Lisa C. Allen

Court of Appeals (majority reversed, partial dissent upheld)

Opinion by Judge Russell Mock, joined by Judge Robert Winkler

Dissent by Judge Candace Crouse, who found Grandmother’s complaint sufficient to establish wanton or reckless conduct by the individual caseworkers for failing to investigate the report of abuse and neglect by Children’s Hospital adequately.

Concluding Observations

Because I was an unpaid consultant to Grandmother, I did not predict the outcome. But now I can say I thought Judge Crouse clearly had the better side of the court of appeals decision and I am glad to see that this case got reversed and remanded, which my student contributor Maria Ruwe predicted. The blog will continue to follow this case.