Update: On December 22, 2021 the Supreme Court of Ohio handed down a merit decision in this case. In an opinion written by Justice Donnelly, joined in full by Chief Justice O’Connor and Justice Fischer, the Court held that the arrest warrant at issue sufficiently complied with Crim R. 4 even with the absence of a court official’s signature on the warrant and there was no Fourth Amendment violation in the case. Justice Stewart concurred in judgment only.  Justice Brunner concurred in judgment only with an opinion. Justice DeWine dissented and would dismiss the case as improvidently allowed. Justice Kennedy joined DeWine’s opinion.

Read an analysis of the argument here.

On June 29, 2021, the Supreme Court of Ohio will hear oral argument in State of Ohio v. Kandale L. Harrison, 2020-1117. At issue is whether an unsigned arrest warrant is defective and, if so, whether an officer’s good faith reliance on it saves it from a motion to suppress evidence.

Case Background

Kandale L. Harrison allegedly sold about four grams of cocaine to a police informant in a controlled drug buy in early February 2018. Detective Brent Joseph of the Logan County Sheriff’s Office then sought an arrest warrant for Harrison.  Bellefontaine Municipal Court clerks, however, had developed a practice of not entering warrants into the public computer system to prevent suspects from discovering open warrants against them and fleeing.  At the time, it was also the practice of the court not to sign the warrant until after it was served, for the protection of the officers.

After requesting an arrest warrant, Detective Joseph received two pages from the court: an unsigned, blank arrest warrant and the complaint, which was stamped and initialed by a municipal court judge. Detective Joseph testified that he believed the stamp and initials rendered the warrant valid.

At Detective Joseph’s request, a road deputy stopped Harrison’s vehicle in early March 2018, with the arrest warrant as the sole basis for the stop. Harrison allegedly possessed more than seven grams of cocaine, a loaded weapon, and about $6,200 in cash in his vehicle. Detective Joseph then arrived and arrested Harrison pursuant to the warrant. A clerk signed the arrest warrant one day after the stop.

Harrison pled not guilty after a grand jury returned a nine-count indictment. He moved to suppress the evidence from the stop. Harrison argued the arrest warrant was defective under Crim. R. 4(A) because it lacked an authority’s signature. Rule 4 governs the issuance and contents of arrest warrants.

Retired Hardin County Judge David Faulkner, sitting by assignment in the Logan County Court of Common Pleas, found the warrant defective because it was not signed by any person authorized to issue the warrant, and that the good faith exception did not apply because it was not objectively reasonable for an experienced officer to rely on the legitimacy of this unsigned warrant.  Judge Faulkner granted Harrison’s motion and suppressed all evidence recovered during the vehicle stop. Judge Faulkner found that common sense and experience show that without an authorized person’s signature, no warrant exists. Therefore, at the time of Harrison’s arrest, no valid arrest warrant existed, and therefore there could be no lawful search incident to arrest. 

The State appealed.

The Appeal

In an opinion written by Judge Stephen Shaw and joined by Judge William Zimmerman, in which Judge John Willamowski concurred in judgment only,  the Third District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment. The appeals court did not decide whether the unsigned arrest warrant was defective, as it found Detective Joseph reasonably relied on the municipal court judge’s stamp and initials, and reasonably believed he had a valid warrant. The appeals court found this met the good faith exception, even if the warrant did not properly comply with Crim.R. 4. Since there was no police misconduct to deter, the exclusionary rule did not apply.

Key Statutes and Precedent

U.S. Constitution, Amendment IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”)

Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 14 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons … against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing … the person … to be seized.”)

R.C. 2935.03(B)(1) (a peace officer may arrest and detain a person before a warrant is obtained if the officer has reasonable cause to believe the person is guilty of various offenses, including a felony drug offense.)

R.C. 2935.18 (“A warrant shall be directed to a specific officer or to a department designated by its chief, and shall command such officer or member of department to take the accused and bring the accused forthwith before the magistrate or court issuing such warrant…”)

Crim. Rule 4(A)(1) (if probable cause appears to exist, a judge, magistrate or other official shall issue an arrest warrant.)

 Crim. Rule 4(C)(1) (a warrant shall contain the defendant’s name or defendant’s description, a description of the offense, the applicable statute or ordinance, and whether the warrant is being issued before the defendant has appeared or was scheduled to appear.)

State v. Heston, 29 Ohio St.2d 152 (1972) (“[a]n arrest without a warrant is valid where the arresting officer has probable cause to believe that a felony was committed by defendant and the circumstances are such as to make it impracticable to secure a warrant.”)

Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (probable cause determination necessary for an arrest warrant can be made after arrest.)

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (“when police act in an objectively reasonable manner in executing a search believed in good faith to be legal, there is no bad conduct to deter” under the exclusionary rule.)

State v. Spaw, 18 Ohio App.3d 77 (3d Dist. 1984) (a search warrant is void ab initio if it lacks any signature at all and officers could not have reasonably presumed its validity. Officers cannot exercise such a facially defective warrant in good faith.)

State v. Williams, 57 Ohio St.3d 24 (1991) (“A search warrant is void ab initio if not signed by a judge prior to the search,” and in such cases, the evidence seized must be suppressed.)

State v. Williams, 2001-Ohio-1388 (2d Dist.) (“an unsigned warrant, being void ab initio, cannot be executed in good faith.”)

State v. Brown, 2007-Ohio-4837 (arrest based on probable cause and executed in a public place does not violate the Fourth Amendment.)

Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) (the exclusionary rule is a deterrent sanction barring prosecutors from introducing evidence obtained via a Fourth Amendment violation.)

State v. Hoffman, 2014-Ohio-4795 (suppression of the evidence not appropriate for a warrant lacking probable cause finding because officers relied on the warrant and acted in good faith.)

State v. Trout, 2019-Ohio-124 (good faith exception does not apply when officer held an unreasonable interpretation of the law.)

Votes to Accept the Case

Yes: Justices French, Fischer, Donnelly, and Kennedy.

No: Chief Justice O’Connor and Justices DeWine and Stewart.

Harrison’s Propositions of Law Accepted for Review

Proposition of Law 1

An arrest warrant that is not signed by a judge, magistrate, clerk of court, or officer designated by the judge, does not comply with Criminal Rule 4.

Proposition of Law 2

A law enforcement officer’s reliance on an arrest warrant that is not signed pursuant [to] Criminal Rule 4 does not qualify for the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

Harrison’s Argument

An unsigned arrest warrant does not comply with the law. In State v. Williams, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that unsigned search warrants are void ab initio. Though Williams dealt with a search warrant rather than an arrest warrant, the distinction between the warrant types has no significance. Williams applies to the arrest warrant in this case. Suspects’ right to be free of unreasonable seizures deserves the same degree of protection, if not more, than their right to be free of unreasonable searches of their personal property.

The issuing judge’s initials and date on the complaint does not cure the defective warrant.  The ostensible arrest warrant against Mr. Harrison was thus void at the outset, and the trial court properly suppressed the evidence obtained during the traffic stop. Despite Mr. Harrison citing to Williams, the Third District failed to apply this Court’s binding decision from that case.

The unsigned warrant did not comply with Crim.R.4(C)(1) because it lacked the requisite defendant and offense information. Additionally, it failed to comply with R.C. 2935.18 because it was not directed to a specific officer or department. R.C. 2935.18 uses the word “command,” which means that a judge is required to sign an arrest warrant. The warrant was nothing more than a preprinted form with none of the blanks filled in, and Detective Joseph’s reliance on it was objectively unreasonable.

The State is wrong to suggest an arrest warrant should be treated differently than a search warrant. Both protect constitutional rights of equal importance. Williams deemed a signature requirement as the “best device” for safeguarding Fourth Amendment rights and comparable rights protected by Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution.

While the State argues Mr. Harrison could have been arrested even without a valid warrant, the State never raised this argument in the lower courts and has thus waived it. Even if the State’s argument applies, a warrantless arrest must rely on circumstances rendering it impracticable to obtain a warrant, but no such circumstances existed here. Detective Joseph had sufficient time and opportunity to secure a valid warrant but failed to do so.

The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply as a matter of law to a warrant that is void from the outset. Even if it could be applied, it would not save this warrant as Detective Joseph was objectively unreasonable in relying on it based on the statutory and case precedent that prove its deficiencies.

The evidence should be suppressed as the trial court ordered.

State’s Argument

Crim. R. 4 does not contain a requirement that the reviewing authority sign the warrant, and even if it did, an absent signature does not trigger a constitutional violation for which suppression is the remedy. Rule 4 and the Fourth Amendment require a finding of probable cause by the reviewing authority. A signature is a practical way of showing this, but there are other ways of showing the warrant was properly reviewed. Here, the municipal court judge found probable cause to issue the arrest warrant, as indicated by her initials and the “Probable Cause Found” stamp on the complaint. All necessary constitutional requirements were met here.

The Williams case involved a search warrant, not an arrest warrant as is at issue here. The two warrants protect different interests. Whereas search warrants protect privacy interests, arrests rarely involve such interests. Liberty interests, at stake with arrest warrants, have exceptions: warrantless arrests are allowed by police under certain circumstances. R.C. 2935.03(B) permits officers to execute warrantless arrests when they have reasonable cause to believe a person committed various crimes, including a felony drug abuse offense. Thus, Detective Joseph did not even need a warrant to arrest Mr. Harrison.

Though a probable cause determination may be made after an arrest, Detective Joseph had probable cause to arrest Mr. Harrison, as he personally observed Mr. Harrison sell cocaine to an informant.

This case is governed by State v. Hoffman, not State v. Williams. Even if the arrest warrant is deemed invalid, this Court in Hoffman held evidence suppression is not appropriate when officers rely in good faith on a warrant, even a warrant lacking probable cause.

Evidence suppression is meant to deter police misconduct, but here Detective Joseph is not at fault for the alleged defect in the warrant. Law enforcement relied in good faith on the warrant. Detective Joseph believed he had a valid warrant because the municipal judge and the clerk had signed the attached complaint. A clerk testified that she believed once a judge found probable cause on a complaint, the warrant was valid, and that the court routinely signed warrants only after they had been served.

The evidence recovered under the valid arrest warrant should not be suppressed and the Third District’s opinion must be affirmed.

Student Contributor: Max Londberg