Oral Argument Preview: How Much Training is Required for School Teachers and Staff to Carry Firearms in Ohio’s Schools? Erin G. Gabbard, et al. v. Madison Local School District Board of Education, et al.

By Marianna Bettman on January 4, 2021

Update: On June 23, 2021 the Supreme Court of Ohio handed down a merit decision in this case. Read the analysis here.

On January 12, 2021, the Supreme Court of Ohio will hear oral argument in Erin G. Gabbard, et al. v. Madison Local School District Board of Education, et al., 2020-0612. At issue in this case is how much training schoolteachers and staffs must complete in order to carry firearms while working in Ohio’s schools.

Case Background

In 2016, a high school student came to Madison Junior-Senior High School with a handgun. The student entered the cafeteria and shot four other students. None of the injuries were fatal. Many personnel described feelings of helplessness and while there was one deputy sheriff acting as a school resource officer at the school, it took almost fifteen minutes for additional law enforcement to respond to the rural Butler County school.

In response, the Madison Local School District Board of Education (“Madison Local”) passed a resolution and later a Firearms Authorization Policy to implement it, which authorizes certain employees to carry concealed weapons while working at the school. These employees were designated as “approved volunteers.” The volunteers had to be licensed to carry a concealed weapon in Ohio, pass a criminal background check, receive mental preparation training in the event of an active shooter, undergo a mental health examination, and pass an annual drug test. In addition, volunteers had to complete at least 24 hours of active shooter training – most common of which is the three-day Faculty/Administrator Safety Training and Emergency Response (“FASTER”) program tailored to train schoolteachers and officials to respond quickly and effectively to active shooter situations. In enacting this resolution, Madison Local purported to act within its authority granted in R.C. 2923.122.

R.C. 2923.122 makes it a crime to carry firearms in a school. If one of the listed exceptions in R.C. 2923.122 applies, that individual is permitted to carry a firearm in a school zone and will not face prosecution. Standard exceptions include security officers, federal agents, or law enforcement personnel who are independently authorized to carry deadly weapons. A broader exemption from prosecution is conferred on “any other person who has written authorization from the board of education or governing body of a school.” Madison Local relied on this latter exception to pass its resolution.

In 2018, several staff at Madison Local completed the FASTER active shooter training, met all other statutory requirements, and were authorized by Madison Local’s superintendent to possess a firearm while at the school.

Concerned for the safety risks posed to their children, a group of parents (collectively, “Gabbard”) sued Madison Local to stop implementation of the resolution on the grounds that it violated the training requirements of R.C. 109.78(D) which states “no educational institution … shall employ a person as a special police officer, security guard, or other position in which such person goes armed while on duty.” There are exceptions to this for individuals who have “completed an approved basic peace officer training program” or have “completed twenty years of active duty as a peace officer.” Peace officer training requires a minimum of 728 hours of training plus a background check, fitness test, and drug screen in order to obtain a peace officer certification. Gabbard argued that Madison Local’s mere 24 hours of active shooter training fell far short of the 728 hours or twenty years’ experience that R.C. 109.78 requires of armed school employees.

After Madison Local passed the resolution, Gabbard sought a permanent injunction to stop Madison Local from implementing the resolution unless the employees completed the requisite basic peace officer training in accordance with R.C. 109.78.

Both Madison Local and Gabbard moved for summary judgment on the injunction request. Butler County Common Pleas Court Judge Charles Pater granted summary judgment to Madison Local on grounds that the two statutes did not conflict, and Madison Local’s resolution was consistent with the broad mandates of R.C. 2923.122. Gabbard appealed.

The Appeal

In a 2-1 decision authored by Judge Robert Ringland and joined by Judge Robert Hendrickson, the Twelfth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment. Consequently, Madison Local’s resolution was found to violate R.C. 109.78 and the resolution’s implementation was halted. The appeals court majority found that R.C. 2923.122 did not grant Madison Local the authority to enact a resolution beyond the clear and unambiguous mandates of R.C. 109.78. While applicable to special police officers and security guards, R.C. 109.78’s use of the phrase “or other position in which such person goes armed while on duty” applied to Madison Local staff and teachers. If Madison Local wanted to allow its teachers to be armed, R.C. 109.78, which the appeals court found to be unambiguous, requires that they possess the training required of peace officers – namely 728 hours of training or twenty years’ experience as an active peace officer.

The majority also found R.C. 2923.122 to be unambiguous. R.C. 2923.122 plainly permits Madison Local to provide written authorization so that an individual is not subject to prosecution for carrying a weapon in its school zone. However, Madison Local and other school boards may not circumvent the training requirements of R.C. 109.78 under the guise of R.C. 2923.122. If the General Assembly wishes to reduce the amount of firearms training required for teachers and staff, that is its prerogative. But the courts cannot ignore the clear mandates of R.C. 109.78 and will not substitute its policy judgments for that of the legislature or opine on the wisdom of permitting teachers to carry firearms in schools.

In a separate concurrence, Judge Hendrickson emphasized that it is untenable to think that the General Assembly would require peace officer level training of employees in R.C. 109.78, but then grant local school boards unchecked authority to permit armed teachers and staff to walk around with almost no training at all. He would find that any armed school employees must meet either the training or peace officer experience required in R.C. 109.78.

Judge Stephen Powell dissented on the issue pertinent to this appeal. He would find the phrase “or other position” in R.C. 109.78 to be ambiguous, and thus in need of interpretation. Powell would find that R.C. 109.78 only mandates higher training requirements for school police officers, security guards, or other similar positions. If local school boards want to authorize other employees to carry firearms, they may do so freely under R.C. 2923.122. Madison Local did not violate R.C. 109.78 and consequently, its resolution permitting teachers and staff to carry firearms is valid and enforceable.

Votes to Accept the Case

Yes: Chief Justice O’Connor, Justices Kennedy, French, Fischer, DeWine, Donnelly, and Stewart.

Madison Local’s Proposition of Law Accepted for Review

Ohio law does not require school administrators, teachers, and support staff to attend the police academy or have twenty years’ experience as a police officer in order to be authorized by a board of education to carry a firearm in a school safety zone.

Gabbard’s Proposed Counter Proposition of Law

Ohio law requires a school employee to meet the training or experience requirements of R.C. 109.78(D) if “such person goes armed while on duty.”

Key Statutes and Precedent

R.C. 109.78(D) (Certification Requirements)(“No public or private educational institution … shall employ a person as a special police officer, security guard, or other position in which such person goes armed while on duty, who has not received a certificate of having satisfactorily completed an approved basic peace officer training program, unless the person has completed twenty years of active duty as a peace officer.”)

R.C. 2929.122 (A)( “No person shall knowingly convey, or attempt to convey, a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance into a school safety zone.”)

R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) (those exempted from criminal prosecution for carrying a firearm in a school safety zone include: “An officer, agent, or employee of this or any other state or the United States who is authorized to carry deadly weapons or dangerous ordnance and is acting within the scope of the officer’s, agent’s, or employee’s duties, a law enforcement officer who is authorized to carry deadly weapons or dangerous ordnance, a security officer employed by a board of education or governing body of a school during the time that the security officer is on duty pursuant to that contract of employment, or any other person who has written authorization from the board of education or governing body of a school to convey deadly weapons or dangerous ordnance into a school safety zone or to possess a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance in a school safety zone and who conveys or possesses the deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance in accordance with that authorization.”)

George H. Dingledy Lumber Co. v. Erie R. Co., 102 Ohio St. 236 (1921 ) (“where an enumeration of specific things is followed by some more general word or phrase, such general word or phrase should be held to include only things of the same general nature as those specified.”)

United Tel. Co. of Ohio v. Limbach, 71 Ohio St.3d 369 (1994) (“This court in the interpretation of related and co-existing statutes must harmonize and give full application to all such statutes unless they are irreconcilable and in hopeless conflict.”)

Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth, 87 Ohio St.3d 549 (2000) (“when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need for this court to apply the rules of statutory interpretation.”)

Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., 2010-Ohio-1029 (It is not the role of the courts “to establish legislative policies or to second-guess the General Assembly’s policy choices. The General Assembly is responsible for weighing policy concerns and making policy decisions.”)

Madison Local’s Argument

R.C. 2923.122 is best understood as an Authorization Statute. The Authorization Statute is unambiguous, and its plain language must be squarely applied, not read in subordination to R.C. 109.78. In relying upon R.C. 109.78 in an unrelated chapter of the Code, the Twelfth District gutted the clear language of the Authorization Statute and its decision must be reversed.

The Authorization Statute is clear: local school districts are permitted, based on criteria each district sees fit, to authorize any “other persons” to carry firearms on school grounds for the protection of school occupants. A school district could authorize either open carry or concealed carry. If open, only the Board’s own qualifications and training requirements would apply. If concealed carry is authorized, authorized personnel must meet the requirements for a concealed carry license, since the Authorization Statute does not supersede Ohio’s concealed-carry laws.

The Authorization Statute, which is in the Attorney General’s chapter of the Revised Code, does not even mention R.C. 109.78, or hint at any additional training prerequisites these “other persons” must have. All the “other persons” need is local school board authorization, not 728 hours of training or twenty years of experience. Just as the Authorization Statute makes no mention of R.C. 109.78, the latter also makes no reference to the former. This reading reflects the legislative intent to defer to the judgment of local school districts.

Courts must harmonize and give full application to related and co-existing statutes. Indeed, the plain language of both the Authorization Statute and R.C. 109.78 can be given effect. The training requirements of R.C. 109.78 apply to school districts only when the district employs a special police officer, security guard, school resource officer, or some other position like those listed, not to school staff authorized to carry a weapon for the protection of the students and staff. But, standing alone, the Authorization Statute allows a board of education to authorize “any other person” to carry a firearm in its school zones. When read together, if a board of education hires a school police officer or other equivalent person, that employee must possess the required training under R.C. 109.78. However, under the Authorization Statute, the same board of education may authorize any other employee such as an algebra teacher to carry a firearm pursuant to whatever policy it may craft.

The statutory construction arguments relied upon by both the Twelfth District and Gabbard are illogical and in effect render the Authorization Statute meaningless. The Authorization Statute clearly exempts two distinct groups that may carry firearms in a school safety zone: (1) law enforcement and school security officers and (2) “any other person authorized by the school district.” If the extensive training requirements of R.C. 109.78 were imposed upon these “other persons” then they too would qualify as school security officers and would not need school board authorization at all. Clearly, the General Assembly could not have intended such a result. The General Assembly could have expressed such an intent in R.C. 109.78, but it did not do so. The courts should not broadly interpret R.C. 109.78 so as to nullify the authority delegated to local school boards in the Authorization Statute. Rather, the Authorization Statute reflects a legislative judgment to defer to local school districts which are best situated to determine what works best to protect their students. A one-size-fits-all approach to school safety does not work – the approach that works best in Cleveland may not work at all in a rural district like Madison Local.

Madison Local’s resolution to arm teachers and staff complies with Ohio law in all respects. The policy complies with R.C. 109.78 because teachers who volunteer for the program are not employed in a position where the duties involve being armed and therefore do not require peace officer training. In fact, both of Madison Local’s school resource officers are Butler County sheriff’s deputies who satisfy the training requirements in R.C. 109.78. The resolution complies with the power granted to local school boards to address local safety needs under the Authorization Statute. The resolution not only requires that volunteer teachers and staff have a concealed carry permit, but it actually goes much farther by requiring that each volunteer complete 24 hours of active shooter training and pass mental health, criminal background, and drug screening tests. When this entire statutory framework is squarely applied, the judgment of the Twelfth District must be reversed.

Gabbard’s Argument

R.C. 109.78 squarely governs this dispute and Madison Local’s reliance upon R.C. 2923.122 is not only misplaced, but the policy it adopted violates R.C. 109.78. In fact, R.C. 2923.122 is more appropriately called the “Criminal Statute” – not the Authorization Statute – because all it says is that a person carrying a firearm in a school building with board authorization cannot be prosecuted. That is all the statute does. R.C. 2933.122 does not override any other Ohio law, or any pre-existing training requirements, does not render R.C. 109.78 useless, and certainly does not grant school boards the unchecked authority to permit teachers to go armed while on duty with whatever level of training the local board desires. Both R.C. 109.78 and R.C. 2933.122 can and do live in harmony: the latter prevents those who carry in schools from being prosecuted while the former sets the training hour requirements for those who carry firearms in schools.

First, R.C. 109.78 is unambiguous as to which employees must complete peace officer training – “a special police officer, security guard, or other position in which such person goes armed while on duty.” The term position is defined as one’s “job.” Armed is defined as “equipped with or carrying a weapon.” “On duty” is defined as “engaged in one’s regular work.” Plainly, Madison Local’s resolution allows teachers, administrators, and staff to “go armed while on duty.” It is true that Madison Local teachers and staff may not be employed for the sole purpose of carrying a firearm to protect students, but R.C. 109.78 does not require that at all. R.C. 109.78 simply requires that if one of the “other positions” goes armed while “on duty,” they must have basic peace officer training. In this case, all of Madison Local’s authorized teachers are armed while on duty. Madison Local’s reading of R.C. 109.78 seeks to add words to the statute. Neither Madison Local nor the courts can insert words to an unambiguous statute.

Second, Madison Local inaccurately emphasizes the fact that its armed teachers are not employed to carry firearms, but rather “volunteer” to carry while on duty. However, the applicability of R.C. 109.78 does not turn on whether a school employee is employed or volunteers. Rather, R.C. 109.78 is framed in terms of the “person” employed by a school. The distinction Madison Local envisions is not embedded in the word “employ” or “position,” and the Court should not add ambiguity to the unambiguous statute. Even if such distinction existed, providing school security becomes part of any employee’s position as a teacher or administrator who must meet the requirements of R.C. 109.78. In short, there is no exemption in R.C. 109.78(D) for a person the school employs in a position where that person voluntarily goes armed while on duty.

Finally, Madison Local’s numerous arguments for rewriting 109.78 fail. First, to argue that the “other positions” in R.C. 109.78 only apply to positions similar to security officers, Madison Local incorrectly relies on the ejusdem generis canon of statutory construction. This canon is only to be used when a statute is ambiguous and R.C. 109.78 is not. This canon should not be used to add words or change the meaning of an unambiguous statute. Second, R.C. 109.78 is not narrowly applicable only to police or security officers as Madison Local suggests. In two sections preceding 109.78(D), the General Assembly chose to specifically limit the scope of the provisions by using the phrase “persons otherwise employed in a police capacity.” In contrast, the legislature’s use of the “other positions” language in 109.78(D) suggests an intent to apply more broadly – to persons who go armed while on duty even beyond just security personnel. Additionally, the Ohio General Assembly has considered exempting teachers to carry guns in school under R.C. 109.78 before but has not done so. In the wake of the 2013 shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary, the Ohio House passed an exemption under R.C. 109.78 to permit teachers authorized by their local school board to carry firearms at school. The measure failed to pass the Ohio Senate. Again, in the 2017-18 session, a similar proposal failed to pass the General Assembly. And even now, immediately following the Twelfth District’s decision, the S.B 317 was introduced to eliminate the R.C. 109.78 training requirements for teachers to carry firearms in schools so long as they had school board authorization. While the Senate has passed S.B. 317, the House has not and R.C. 109.78 remains in full effect.

Finally, the Court should not consider Madison Local’s policy or unintended consequences arguments when interpreting an unambiguous statute. Distilled to its essence, Madison Local argues the requirements of R.C. 109.78(D) unduly limit the discretion of school boards to determine whether or not to arm its teachers because its training requirements are too onerous. But that is a policy decision which belongs to the General Assembly. While school districts can always lobby the legislature to exempt their teachers from the now-required peace officer training, or tailor a training program just for this situation, that is not the current state of the law.

Gabbard and the other parents have no animosity toward firearms – they are merely concerned for the safety risks posed to their children from armed teachers who are inadequately trained. Adopting Madison Local’s argument would allow local boards to circumvent the training requirements of R.C. 109.78 under the guise of R.C. 2933.122 (D)(1)(a). It is unfathomable that the General Assembly recognized the need to protect students by ensuring school peace officers and security guards had extensive experience, but then permit armed teachers and staff to walk around schools with minimal training. The Twelfth District’s decision must be affirmed.

Amici in Support of Madison Local

Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost

The Attorney General has an interest in ensuring Ohio’s local school districts are free to make individualized decisions about how best to protect Ohio’s school children. The Attorney General has particular interests in this dispute because he oversees the Ohio peace officer and security personnel training programs and both the current and past Attorneys General have opined that Ohio law does not require teachers to become police officers to carry a firearm at school.

The training requirements of R.C. 109.78 are tucked within a one thousand word statute dealing exclusively with the Attorney General’s management of the Ohio security personnel training program. The Twelfth District’s reading makes it practically impossible for a school district to utilize R.C. 2923.122 to permit individuals to carry firearms. No teacher has the time to complete over 728 hours of training and much of the peace officer training is irrelevant to active shooter preparation. Finally, the word “employ” in R.C. 109.78 suggests that only those employed by a school district must meet the training requirements. In contrast, the Madison Local teachers volunteer to carry firearms while employed as a teacher or secretary – positions that have nothing to do with going armed while on duty.

Attorney General’s Proposed Proposition of Law

R.C. 109.78(D)’s training requirements apply only to school employees hired to serve in a role comparable to that of a security guard or police officer—the statute does not apply to other employees authorized to carry a gun under R.C. 2923.122.

Claymont City Schools, et al.

Amici are numerous Ohio school districts that have relied upon the Authorization Statute to permit certain administrators, teachers, and support staff to carry firearms while at school to protect against the threat of an active shooter. Amici include: Claymont City Schools, East Guernsey Local Schools, Edgerton Local Schools, Hardin Community School, Hardin-Houston Local Schools, Jackson Center Local Schools, Mad River Local Schools, Manchester Local Schools, Morgan Local Schools, New Lebanon Local Schools, Noble Local Schools, River View Local Schools, Rolling Hills Local School District, Russia Local Schools, Sidney City Schools, Streetsboro City Schools, and Upper Scioto Valley School District (collectively, “the Districts”).

The Districts argue that the decision whether to arm school staff is best left to locally elected boards of education. A one-size-fits-all approach to student safety simply doesn’t work; local school districts must be given the flexibility to determine what is best for them. The Court of Appeals decision would make the arming of staff totally impractical. Further, hiring one additional resource officers costs a district over $50,000 per year. School districts can save money and resources by simply exercising the authority the General Assembly granted them in R.C. 2923.122 and permit teachers to carry firearms. The Districts simply want to keep their students and staff safe. The Twelfth District’s decision usurps the authority of local boards and should be reversed.

The Districts’ Proposed Proposition of Law

Amici in Support of Gabbard et al.

Fraternal Order of Police of Ohio, Inc.

The Fraternal Order of Police of Ohio (“FOP of Ohio”) consists of more than 23,000 law enforcement officers, including school resource officers. The FOP of Ohio is interested in ensuring that those who brandish firearms during an active-shooter incident have adequate training to handle such an unexpected crisis. To carry a firearm is an “awesome responsibility” and to use it properly in a life-or-death situation requires more than a weekend’s worth of practice shooting at paper targets. The plain language of R.C. 109.78 needs to be applied or innocent people will be killed. Extensive training is required because shooter accuracy decreases in high-pressure situations, untrained teachers may actually add to the chaos, firearms may end up in the hands of students, and untrained teachers will be mentally unprepared for the task of taking the life of a shooter who could be one of their own students. An interpretation that requires extensive training of a police officer but not of the art teacher is neither just nor reasonable.

Ohio F.O.P.’s Proposed Proposition of Law

The plain language of R.C. 109.78(D) is unambiguous; applying it to armed teachers is the only common-sense interpretation.

Ohio Education Association and Ohio Federation of Teachers

The Ohio Education Association (“OEA”) is a non-profit organization representing over 121,000 public school teachers and 642 Ohio public school districts. The Ohio Federation of Teachers (“OFT”) is a union of 15,000 professionals working in mostly urban school districts. Collectively, these amici represent the overwhelming majority of Ohio’s public-school employees and have an interest in protecting the physical safety of students, teachers, and school staff in a thoughtful way. Dangers to student and staff safety increase when teachers who lack tactical knowledge carry firearms. A 2018 study found that 74% of educators opposed arming school staff because they would feel less, not more, safe. The result of any firearms in schools programs should increase, not decrease, school safety as the Madison Local Resolution does.

OEA and OFT’s Proposed Proposition of Law

O.R.C. § 109.78(D)’s text is plain and unambiguous and requires that no school “shall employ a person as a special police officer, security guard, or other position in which such person goes armed while on duty” unless that person either completed a peace-officer training program or previously served for twenty (20) years as an active-duty peace officer. “Other positions” applies to all positions of employment in a school district, including teachers, administrators, and support staff, if they go armed while on duty.

Professor Peter M. Shane

Professor Peter M. Shane teaches and writes on statutory interpretation and separation of powers at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. Professor Shane has an academic interest in seeing Ohio statutes interpreted in a sound manner that follows and respects separation of powers principles. The power to amend statutes and set policy belongs with the General Assembly, not the judiciary. R.C. 109.78 is unambiguous and its training requirements must be applied squarely. To do otherwise is to infringe upon legislative powers. R.C. 2923.122 should not be called an “Authorization Statute” and is irrelevant to this case. While policy arguments underlying this case may represent fair questions for public debate, they should have no impact on the Court’s interpretation and duty to directly apply the statute as written.

Professor Shane’s Proposed Proposition of Law

Foundational separation of powers principles require courts to apply the plain and unambiguous meaning of R.C. 109.78(D) and prohibit courts from engaging in further acts of “interpreting” the statute to arrive at a different result.

Experts in School Safety and Firearms Training

Amici include: Derek Bauman (a police officer for 26 years), Richard Biehl (Dayton Police Chief with more than 35 years of law enforcement experience), Aaron Grant (former Madison Local teacher), Commander Robert Meader (led the Columbus Division of Police Training Bureau), William Modzeleski (former U.S. Department of Justice and Education employee with experience implementing programs and conducting studies related to school safety and violence prevention), and John Rosiak (founder of Prevention Partnerships with decades of school safety experience). Amici are deeply interested in protecting students and educators in a safe, responsible manner.

Amici argue that arming teachers creates serious safety risks for children including an increased access to guns, increased risk of shootings in schools, and decreased accuracy during a high stress situation. To mitigate these risks, extensive training is required. Statistics show that the 24 hours of training Madison Local teachers completed is not enough. The Ohio peace officer training requirements, while imperfect for training those in school settings, is the most appropriate method to protect the safety of schools.

Teacher Educators and Educational Researchers

Amici include 33 professors at The Ohio State University who have studied classroom education, teacher behavior, teacher development, and professional education. Amici are active in the day-to-day activities at educational institutions across Ohio and have a vested interest in the outcome of this case. While R.C. 109.78 is applicable in this case, the necessary training for teachers and staff should go even further. If local school boards decide to allow teachers to carry firearms, more robust initial and continual screenings need to occur. Future screenings must consider the behavioral, managerial, and unique personal traits of each teacher including but not limited to their knowledge, attitudes, experiences, abilities, and ongoing mental health.

Teacher Educators and Educational Researchers’ Proposed Proposition of Law

R.C. 109.78(D)’s training requirements apply to all school employees, including school administrators, teachers, and support staff, if they carry a firearm in a school safety zone.

K-12 Teachers and Staff

Amici include 284 current or former teachers and staff from schools across the State of Ohio. Amici share the safety concerns of Gabbard and express concerns for their own safety should the Court find no training requirements for armed teachers and school staff. Amici’s concerns are encapsulated by an accident in Sparta, Ohio where a six- year -old elementary student opened a teacher’s unlocked drawer, took out his teacher’s firearm, and pointed it at another elementary student. Permitting untrained civilian school staff to carry firearms in school will cause many educators to fear for their physical safety. Further, Ohio’s school districts have lacked transparency in informing parents and other teachers whether school staff are armed or not. Most parents don’t know and cannot find out whether their children are in the presence of armed school staff or not. This lack of transparency has exacerbated the misapplication of the Authorization Statute. R.C. 109.78 is unambiguous and must be applied in this case.

K-12 Teachers and Staffs’ Proposed Proposition of Law

Ohio law requires that teachers and other school staff that go armed while on duty meet the training requirements of R.C. 109.78(D).

Cities of Columbus and Cincinnati

The Cities of Columbus and Cincinnati are local municipal governments in Ohio which are responsible for maintaining safe learning environments in their public and private school systems. Amici cities have an interest in preventing the increased risk from persons armed on-duty who have not completed basic peace officer training. Amici support strong local decision-making authority but only when within the limits of existing state law. R.C. 109.78 is the minimum standard of training required of armed employees. Local districts are free to go above that standard, but not below. Madison Local’s unreasonable interpretation of R.C. 2923.122 would vitiate any minimum training requirements and would be void of any standard of safety to protect Ohio’s school children.

Cities of Columbus and Cincinnati’s Proposed Proposition of Law

While R.C. 109.78(D) provides the minimum training requirement for any individual who carries a firearm in a school, a school district is free to require even more training or to prohibit armed employees completely.

Student Contributor: Brandon Bryer