“Miller mistakenly equates strict compliance with a requirement that the judge recite the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) almost verbatim… We have never mandated that a trial court use particular words in order to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).”
Justice Fischer, opinion of the Court
On April 14, 2020, the Supreme Court of Ohio handed down a merit decision in State v. Miller, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-1420. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Fischer, in which Judge Sadler sat for Justice Stewart, the Court held that in felony cases, trial courts must strictly comply with the plea colloquy required by Crim. R. 11(C)(2)(c), but that strict compliance does not require the exact words in the rule. A trial court does strictly comply when the defendant is advised in an understandable way that the plea waives the rights set forth in the rule, and the defendant in this case was so advised. The case was argued December 11, 2019.
Case Background
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Shawn Miller pleaded guilty to several offenses in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. During the plea hearing, the judge advised Miller of the enumerated constitutional rights he would be entitled to if he chose to go to trial and Miller affirmatively stated that he understood those rights. The judge did not specifically ask Miller if he understood he was waiving those rights. The judge accepted the plea and sentenced him to eight years in prison and three years of postrelease control.
In a split decision, the Eighth District Court of Appeals vacated Miller’s guilty pleas, reversed his convictions, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The majority held that strict compliance with Crim.R.11(C)(2) is required and in order to strictly comply, pursuant to Supreme Court precedent set forth in State v. Veney, the trial court had to advise Miller specifically that he would waive his constitutional rights by pleading guilty. The dissenting judge (then-Judge Melody Stewart) found that the trial court had complied with the rule because the court had “meaningfully conveyed the substance of Miller’s rights” to him, and that the Supreme Court of Ohio had never required magic words for a waiver.
Read the oral argument preview of the case here and the analysis of the argument here.
Key Statutes and Precedent
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) (In felony cases, the court . . . shall not accept a plea of guilty . . . without first . . . determining that the defendant understands that by the plea, the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.”)
State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473 (1981) (“[F]or a guilty plea to be voluntarily and intelligently entered, the defendant must be informed that he is waiving” the constitutional rights listed in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). The trial court does not need to use the exact language contained in Crim.R. 11(C) when informing the defendant about his constitutional rights, as long as the rights are explained in a reasonably intelligible manner.)
State v. Griggs, 2004-Ohio-4415 (“Though failure to adequately inform a defendant of his constitutional rights would invalidate a guilty plea under a presumption that it was entered involuntarily and unknowingly, failure to comply [as to] nonconstitutional rights will not invalidate a plea unless the defendant thereby suffered prejudice.”)
State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176 (2008) (“A trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and orally advise a defendant before accepting a felony plea that the plea waives (1) the right to a jury trial, (2) the right to confront one’s accusers, (3) the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses, (4) the right to require the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and (5) the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. When a trial court fails to strictly comply with this duty, the defendant’s plea is invalid. (Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), applied.”)(Syllabus)
State v. Ellis, 2015-Ohio-3438 (10th Dist.) (While strict compliance is required for the notification of constitutional rights, substantial compliance is permissible when determining whether a defendant understood that a guilty plea waived certain constitutional rights.)
State’s Proposition of Law Accepted for Review
A reviewing court applies a substantial compliance standard in determining whether criminal defendants understand they are waiving their constitutional trial rights when entering a plea in a felony case.
Does the Court Adopt the State’s Proposition of Law?
No. The Court determines that the critical issue in this case is what Crim.R.11(C)(2)(c) requires of the trial court and the showing necessary by a defendant to demonstrate the plea is invalid.
Merit Decision
Executive Summary
“The trial court’s colloquy fully complied with the requirements of the rule by conveying the substance of Miller’s constitutional rights to him in a reasonable intelligible manner.”
Analysis
Waiver?
Miller agued the state failed to preserve the issue of whether strict or substantial compliance with Crim.R.11(C)(2)(c) is required in deciding whether defendants understand that by pleading guilty, they are waiving their constitutional rights. On this issue, the Court finds that the state’s failure to argue below for a substantial compliance standard is not grounds to affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Resolving Conflicting Interpretations of Veney
The Eighth District interprets Veney as requiring strict compliance with the rule. The Tenth District, in Ellis, interpreted Veney as allowing substantial compliance. On this point, the Court agrees with the Eighth District.
Veney Requires Strict Compliance
After reviewing the various positions of various justices in Veney, the Court in this case reaffirms the unanimous holding in Veney that trial courts must strictly comply with all parts of Crim.R.11(C)(2)(c), including the part where the trial court must determine that the defendant understands that by pleading guilty he is waiving his constitutional trial rights, and reaffirms the majority holding in Veney that the failure to do so cannot be deemed harmless error.
But What Does Strict Compliance Actually Require?
Here’s what it doesn’t require: a verbatim recitation of the provisions of Crim.R.11(C)(2)(c), and in particular the use of the word “waiver” or its equivalent.
Here’s what is required: the defendant has to be informed of the constitutional rights the defendant will be giving up if the defendant pleads guilty, in words that the defendant can understand.
Case Holding
“A trial court strictly complies with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) when in its plea colloquy with the defendant, it advises the defendant in a manner reasonably intelligible to the defendant that the plea waives the rights enumerated in the rule.” And the Court refuses to require trial judges to use any particular words during the colloquy.
So, Did the Trial Court Strictly Comply in this Case?
Yes. The high court goes through the entire pertinent part of the colloquy in the opinion and concludes that common sense makes it clear that the judge told Miller everything he needed to know in language he could understand. To hold otherwise, Fischer wrote, “would raise form over substance.”
Case Disposition
The judgment of the appeals court is reversed and the guilty pleas and convictions reinstated.
Trial Court Judge
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Judge Janet Burnside
Eighth District Panel
Majority: Opinion Author Judge Eileen T. Gallagher, joined by Judge Kathleen Ann Keough
Dissent: then-Judge Melody Stewart
Concluding Observations
I consider this one a victory for common sense.
Both student contributor Maria Ruwe and I correctly called this for the state. I expressed concern over the state’s concession that it had never argued substantial compliance below, which is what it proposed in its proposition of law, but thought the Court would finesse that by finding strict compliance in this colloquy, using a totality of the circumstances approach.
I wrote this after argument:
“The justices, particularly the Chief and Justices DeWine and Donnelly seemed strongly to feel that the trial court did an excellent job explaining Miller’s rights to him in language he could understand, and common sense dictated that he understood what he was waiving.” Maria also agreed common sense would carry the day, which it did.
During oral argument the Chief commented that in reading the exchange she thought the trial court had done a great job in putting the colloquy in layman’s terms to the defendant. Justice DeWine asked why we shouldn’t use common sense in what an ordinary person would understand in the situation. And as Justice Fischer wrote in the decision, “to reach any other result would raise form over substance.”
I also consider this a win for then-Judge, now Justice Stewart, whose dissent was pretty much adopted by the majority. During argument, Justice Fischer asked the prosecutor if the state was accepting the position in Stewart’s dissent that there was strict compliance here, and the prosecutor seemed relieved to answer yes.