Update: On June 26, 2019, the Supreme Court of Ohio handed down a merit decision in this case.  Read the analysis here.

Read the analysis of the oral argument here.

On March 5, 2019, the Supreme Court of Ohio will hear oral argument in the case Marcella King Piazza v. Cuyahoga County, et al., 2017-1649. At issue in the case is whether the immunity exception allowing civil claims against a political subdivision extends to actions brought after the employee has been terminated by the political subdivision. Second District Court of Appeals Judge Jeffrey Froelich will sit for Justice Stewart, who participated in the appellate decision while on the Eighth District Court of Appeals.

Case Background

In 2003, Marcella King Piazza (“Piazza”) began working for the Cuyahoga County auditor’s office. Piazza was later transferred to the County Board of Revision where she worked as office manager. Subsequently, in August 2010, Piazza was transferred to the Department of Justice Affairs where she worked as a victim advocate. Around the time Piazza was transferred to the Department of Justice Affairs, the Plain Dealer Publishing Company (“Plain Dealer”) began publishing a series of articles about the scandal at the Board of Revision which cost taxpayers over $400 million, claiming that an investigation was underway into the work habits, favoritism, and mismanagement of the department.

In March 2011, Piazza was terminated from employment with the county. Within two hours of Piazza’s discharge, the Plain Dealer published an online article headlined, “Cuyahoga County Executive Ed FitzGerald fires three employees tied to the boards of revision scandal.” One of those fired employees was Piazza, who had in fact never been disciplined or cited for poor work habits and had no authority over any Board member. Further articles identified Piazza by name, included her photo, and again suggested she was part of the Board of Revision corruption scandal.

In 2015, Piazza filed a complaint against Cuyahoga County (“the County”) and the Plain Dealer alleging false light invasion of privacy. The allegation stemmed from quoted statements of county executive FitzGerald which Piazza claimed were made with a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of his statements. The County moved for summary judgment pursuant to R.C. 2744.02. The County also alleged that Piazza’s claim was time-barred. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Peter Corrigan denied the County’s motion, finding the false light claim was not time-barred nor covered by immunity. The County appealed.

On appeal, the Eighth District, in an opinion authored by Judge Kathleen Keough and joined by Judge Mary Boyle, affirmed Judge Corrigan’s denial of summary judgment. According to the majority, the County is not entitled to political subdivision immunity under R.C. 2744.02 because R.C. 2744.09 precludes immunity when a civil suit involves matters related to the employment relationship. On the statute of limitations ruling, the Eighth District did not consider the County’s claim that the trial court erred in its ruling because it was not a final appealable order.

Then-Judge Melody Stewart concurred in part and dissented in part, with an opinion.  She agreed with the majority’s conclusion about the statute of limitations, but not about the false light claim. Judge Stewart interpreted the statutory use of the word “employee” as meaning a person currently employed by the relevant political subdivision. Therefore, the County should be able rightfully to claim immunity from Piazza’s suit because she was not an employee of the County when she filed suit.

Votes to Accept the Case

Yes: Chief Justice O’Connor and Justices DeWine, Kennedy, Fischer, and French.

No:  Justice O’ Donnell

Justice DeGenaro not participating.

Key Statutes and Precedent

R.C. 2744.02(C) (An order that denies a political subdivision or an employee of a political subdivision the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability as provided in this chapter or any other provision of the law is a final order.)

R.C. 2744.09(B) (Political Subdivision Immunity shall not extend to civil actions by an employee against his or her political subdivision relative to any matter that arises out of the employment relationship between the employee and the political subdivision.)

Fleming v. Ashtabula Area City Schools Board of Education, 2008-Ohio-1892 (11th Dist.) (A person need not be a current employee at the time claims were filed against a political subdivision to qualify for the political subdivision immunity exception.)

Sampson v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, 2010-Ohio-3415 (Intentional tort claims can arise out of the employment relationship with respect to R.C. 2744.09(B). To succeed, a claim must show a causal connection between the tort and the employment relationship. Direct causation is not necessary; indirect causation is sufficient.)

George v. Newburgh Heights, 2012-Ohio-2065 (8th Dist.) (Totality of the circumstances review requires examining events that occurred while a person was employed by the political subdivision and after the employment relationship is terminated.)

Vacha v. City of North Ridgeville, 2013-Ohio-3020 (To determine whether a causal connection exists the court must examine the totality of the circumstances. If no connection exists, political subdivision immunity is appropriate.)

County’s Argument

R.C. 2744.09(B) was only intended to create a limited exception to political subdivision immunity. This exception clearly and unambiguously allows civil suits to be brought by an employee arising out of the employment relationship between the employee and the political subdivision. Absent any ambiguity, a court must give effect only to the statute’s plain meaning. No further construction or application is necessary. When Piazza brought her intentional tort claim for false light invasion of privacy she had not been an employee of Cuyahoga County for nearly four and a half years. Because Piazza was not an employee when she filed her complaint, and the alleged intentional tort occurred after her employment relationship had ended, the claim did not arise from her employment relationship. Therefore, the limited exception to political subdivision immunity does not apply.

The General Assembly is presumed to be aware of other statutory provisions concerning a newly enacted statute, even if they are found in separate sections of the Code. The definitions governing R.C. Chapter 2744 define “employee” in the present tense as someone authorized to act for the political subdivision within the scope of employment with the political subdivision. Piazza was an at-will employee subject to termination for no reason or any reason at all. When Piazza did not contest or challenge her removal from public service, she ceased to be an employee for all purposes of the statute. Piazza brought no claims against the county for wrongful termination, for discriminatory firing, did not assert any rights under the classified statutes of the state, or assert a claim for an intentional tort committed by Cuyahoga County during the course of employment arising out of events that occurred within the scope of the employment relationship. Because Piazza’s claim did not arise out of her employment relationship R.C. 2744.09(B) does not apply.

Piazza’s claim for false light against Cuyahoga County did not arise within her employment relationship, but arose because of newspaper articles printed about her by a publication over which the County had no control and to whom the County provided no false statement. Piazza’s real complaint lies with how the newspaper characterized her separation from employment.

Finally, this Court has already articulated that when looking at political subdivision immunity cases it is important to look at the totality of the circumstances when deciding if a causal nexus exists between the issue raised and the employment relationship. In Sampson, for example, even though Sampson brought suit after he was no longer a county employee, the intentional tort claims alleged accrued while he was an employee. And in Vacha, the Court made it clear that the causal connection between the claim and the employment relationship must be established.  The issue Piazza raised before the trial court did not arise from the scope of her employment with the County. The injury she suffered accrued and occurred entirely outside her employment with the County, and after the relationship was terminated. Piazza failed to demonstrate any causal connection between her alleged injury and the actions of the County. As such, her claim that an exception to the political subdivision immunity statute should apply is erroneous and should be dismissed.

Piazza’s Argument

As the County agrees, the statute at issue here is clear and unambiguous. Therefore, no construction is necessary, and the Court should simply apply the statute’s plain meaning. R.C. 2744.09(B) is clear and requires only a causal connection between the subject matter of the civil action and the employment relationship. The Eighth District, applying Sampson, correctly found that Piazza’s claims arose from her employment relationship and that the County was not immune.

The County’s argument that Piazza was not an “employee” within the meaning of the political subdivision immunity statute is based on improper factual assumptions outside the jurisdictional scope of this appeal. The language of R.C. 2744.09(B) does not place conditions on when an action is filed; merely that an employee’s claim arise from the employment relationship. The date a claim is filed has no bearing on whether the cause of action arose from an employment relationship. To determine whether or not a causal connection or causal relationship exists, the court looks to the factual allegations on which the claim is based and considers the totality of the circumstances surrounding it.

Piazza’s claim arises from statements made by the County to a third party about Piazza’s employment and employment termination on the day she was terminated. It should, therefore, be clear that the claim arises from the employment relationship Piazza had with the County. Employment was the only relationship between Piazza and the County, and the comments arose out of her employment because they were directly related to her work performance.

This Court has never limited the employment relationship exception for political subdivision immunity to issues arising from within the scope of employment. The only requirement imposed by this Court has consistently been that a causal connection must be established between the alleged injury and the employment relationship of the parties. The Eighth District correctly found that this threshold had been met in Piazza’s case. Accordingly, the Eighth District’s denial of summary judgement should be affirmed.

Cuyahoga County’s Proposed Propositions of Law

Proposition of Law 1

The language of Ohio Rev. Code §2744.09(B) is clear, concise, and unambiguous and in derogation of common law immunity and must be strictly constructed in keeping with the definition of employee and employment relationship as set forth in the Ohio Revised Code.

Proposition of Law 2

A former employee of a political subdivision who brings an intentional tort claim that accrues after he or she is no longer an employee of the governmental entity is not an “employee” covered under Ohio Rev. Code §2744.09(B).

Proposition of Law 3

Construing Ohio Rev. Code §2744.09 as it is written is in keeping with this Court’s decision in Sampson v. Cuyahoga Metro Hous. Auth., 131 Ohio St.3d 418 (2012) and Vacha v. City of N. Ridgeville, 136 Ohio St.3d 199 (2013) in that the intentional tort at issue in Sampson and Vacha accrued while plaintiffs were employed by the political subdivision and arose out of the employment.

Amici in Support of Piazza

The Fraternal Order of Police (“FOP”) and the Ohio Employment Lawyers Association (“OELA”) filed a brief in support of Piazza.

The FOP is an organization consisting of more than 22,000 law enforcement officers in the State of Ohio, dedicated to the representation of its membership for a multitude of purposes.

OELA is a professional organization comprised of lawyers who represent employees in labor, employment, and civil rights disputes. OELA strives to defend individuals against the tortious conduct of officials and agents of political subdivisions.

Amici reinforce Piazza’s argument that causation is the primary concern when determining whether an employment relationship existed between two parties. The General Assembly’s intent here is clear. The statutory language requires only a causal connection between the claims and the employment relationship. The General Assembly chose not to include language limiting this exception’s scope based on timing. The language used is broad and includes “any matter that arises out of the employment relationship.” If a temporal requirement were inserted it would create perverse incentives and allow employers to fire an employee simply to avoid recourse by the employee. Finally, Amici assert that claims are not limited to those occurring during the employment relationship, but rather, extends to claims arising after the relationship ends provided a causal nexus exists. This requirement sufficiently protects employers from frivolous suits while permitting employees to seek redress for relevant injuries.

Amici’s Proposed Proposition of Law

R.C. 2744.09(B) removes sovereign immunity from political subdivisions for tort claims that relate to political subdivision workplaces, even if the claims arise after the employment itself.

Student Contributor: Paul Taske