Sometimes the most fundamental questions yield the most contentious answers

It sounds like a trick question, doesn’t it? How long is one year? 12 months, right? 365 days (366 in a leap year)? Well, according to a recent Ohio Supreme Court decision, the answer depends on whether you’re counting forward from an event or computing a statutory deadline, and the distinction matters more than you might think.

In Sauter v. Integrity Cycles, L.L.C., 2026-Ohio-88, the Ohio Supreme Court tackled what seems like an impossibly simple question: when Ohio’s saving statute (R.C. 2305.19) says a plaintiff can refile a dismissed complaint within one year, does that mean exactly one year (ending on the anniversary of dismissal) or does it mean a year plus one day? The court split 5-2, with both the majority and dissent claiming their interpretation was the only sensible reading of Ohio’s time-computation statutes.

The facts: One day makes all the difference

Mr. Sauter filed a complaint against Integrity Cycles following a 2018 motorcycle accident. He voluntarily dismissed the case on Jan. 5, 2022, then refiled it on Jan. 6, 2023, 366 days later.

Under the saving statute, in any action that is commenced, if in due time, the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff may commence a new action within one year after the date of the failure or within the period of the original applicable statute of limitations, whichever occurs later. This safety net gives plaintiffs a one-year period to refile a dismissed complaint even if the original statute of limitations has expired.

The question is did Mr. Sauter need to refile by Jan. 5, 2023 (the one-year anniversary) or did he have until Jan. 6, 2023 (one day later)?

The trial court said: Anniversary date controls

The trial court sided with Integrity Cycles and dismissed the refiled complaint as untimely. Following the Tenth District Court of Appeals’ earlier decision in Shue v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2017-Ohio-443, the trial court calculated the one-year period as ending on the anniversary of the dismissal, Jan. 5, 2023. Since Mr. Sauter filed on Jan. 6, 2023, he was one day too late.

The Tenth District reversed and said: It’s a year and a day

On appeal, the Tenth District overruled its own precedent in Shue and sided with Mr. Sauter. The appellate court relied on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Cox v. Dayton Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn., 2016-Ohio-5505, which had added an extra day when calculating a three-month period under Ohio’s arbitration statute.

The Tenth District reasoned that R.C. 1.14, Ohio’s general time-computation statute, required excluding the first day (Jan. 5, 2022) when counting. That meant counting started on Jan. 6, 2022. Twelve months from Jan. 6, 2022, is Jan. 6, 2023. Therefore, Mr. Sauter’s filing was timely.

The Supreme Court majority: Common sense and plain language

Writing for the five-justice majority, Justice Shanahan cut straight to common sense: “If we agree to meet a year from Sept. 15, we agree to meet on Sept. 15, not Sept. 16.” The majority emphasized that when a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts apply it as written. The phrase within one year in the saving statute means within a calendar year, here, from Jan. 5, 2022, to Jan. 5, 2023.

The majority acknowledged that R.C. 1.14 requires excluding the first day when counting but this does not change when the period ends. Rather, R.C. 1.14 explains how to count the days within the period (don’t count day one, do count day 365), not when the period concludes. The period still runs from the dismissal date and ends one year later, on the anniversary.

Supporting this reading, R.C. 1.45 provides that when counting months “from a particular day, the period ends on the same numerical day in the concluding month as the day of the month from which the computation is begun.” (Emphasis sic.) Thus, counting 12 months from Jan. 5, 2022, ends on Jan. 5, 2023.

The majority also took aim at Cox, suggesting the decision “is difficult to reconcile with the statutory scheme” and has “cases like this one demonstrate the confusion that Cox has sown in our case law.” While declining to overrule Cox outright (since the current case involves years, not months), the majority foreshadowed a potential future ruling on the on Cox’s continued validity in the calculation of months.

The dissent: Follow the statutes as written

Chief Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Hawkins, dissented. The dissent argued that the majority ignored the plain language of Ohio’s time-computation statutes working together.

According to the dissent, R.C. 1.44(B) defines year as 12 consecutive months. R.C. 1.45 says months are counted to “the same numerical day in the concluding month as the day of the month from which the computation is begun.” (Emphasis sic.) And R.C. 1.14 tells us that computation begins “by excluding the first and including the last day.”

Reading these statutes together, the dissent concluded that “the day of the month from which the computation is begun” is the day after the triggering event (here, Jan. 6, 2022), because R.C. 1.14 requires excluding the first day. Twelve months from Jan. 6, 2022, is Jan. 6, 2023.

The dissent defended Cox as correctly decided and argued that the majority’s interpretation contradicts Ohio’s statutory framework. While acknowledging that counting 12 months this way yields 366 days from the triggering event, the dissent noted that “the result is not so absurd that we can deviate from the literal meaning of the words the General Assembly wrote.”

What does this mean for Ohio practitioners?

This decision settles (for now) how to calculate the one-year refiling period under the saving statute: count to the anniversary date, not one day beyond.

Practitioners should note several important points:

1. When in doubt, file on the anniversary date, not the day after. This decision makes it clear that waiting until the day after a one-year deadline is too late.
2. While the majority strongly criticized Cox and questioned its continued viability, the court declined to overrule it. Nevertheless, the safe bet is to count months consistent with this court’s year calculation to the anniversary date.
3. This 5-2 split, with both sides claiming their interpretation follows the plain statutory language, suggests the General Assembly may consider clarifying Ohio’s time-computation statutes.
4. This case involved R.C. 2305.19’s saving statute, but the principles apply broadly to any statute requiring action within one year of a triggering event. Examples include:

R.C. 2305.111(B) generally requires, subject to certain exceptions, that civil actions for assault and battery be brought within one year after the cause of action accrued;

R.C. 2305.113(A) provides that medical malpractice claims must be filed within one year after the cause of action accrued; and

R.C. 2117.061(D) requires Medicaid estate recovery claims to be submitted no later than one year after the decedent’s death (or 90 days after receipt of notice, whichever is later).