We often hear the phrase “words matter” in appellate practice, but rarely does a case turn so heavily on the specific grammatical function of a single transitive verb. In a decision released last month, Z.J. v. R.M., 2025-Ohio-5662, the Ohio Supreme Court resolved a long-standing district conflict regarding the menacing-by-stalking statute.

The holding clarifies that a petitioner for a civil protection order (CPO) need not prove they actually suffered mental distress—only that the offender knowingly caused them to believe they would. But perhaps the most memorable takeaway for appellate practitioners is the dissent’s use of a visual aid that takes us all back to grade school English class: a sentence diagram.

The conflict: Belief vs. Reality

R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) provides that no person shall “knowingly cause another person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person or cause mental distress to the other person.”

The split among the appellate districts was sharp:

• The Fifth District (and the trial court in this case) held that the verb believe modifies both physical harm and mental distress. In other words, if a victim believed the offender would cause them mental distress, the statute was satisfied.

• The Fourth, Seventh and Ninth Districts had previously held that while a belief in physical harm was sufficient, the statute required proof of actual mental distress.

In Z.J., the respondent, R.M., argued that because the petitioner never proved he actually suffered mental distress, the CPO should be vacated.

Writing for the majority, Justice Hawkins engaged in a careful parsing of the statute that felt less like a legal opinion and more like a masterclass in syntax.

The court noted that the statute’s first sentence is complex but essentially consists of a subject (no person), a verb (shall knowingly cause), and an object. The majority explained that the verb cause is transitive and requires an object to complete its meaning.

The court ultimately sided with the Fifth District, relying on parallelism. Because the clauses cause physical harm and cause mental distress are presented in a parallel structure following the phrase to believe that the offender will, the court determined that believe must modify both.

As the court put it, to read the statute otherwise would create a grammatical quagmire or an act of syntactical violence.

The dissent: A picture is worth a thousand words

Chief Justice Kennedy dissented with an opinion (Justice Brunner merely dissented). The Chief Justice argued that the statute is grievously ambiguous and that the Rule of Lenity should apply, requiring the court to interpret the statute in the light most favorable to the accused (i.e., requiring actual mental distress).

To demonstrate just how ambiguous the statute is, Chief Justice Kennedy did something rarely seen in Ohio jurisprudence: she included a literal sentence diagram in the body of the opinion.

The graphic, reproduced in the opinion at paragraph 59, maps the statute into two distinct paths. The dissent argued that one valid grammatical reading allows for a path where cause mental distress stands alone, independent of the verb believe.

Because the text could reasonably be diagrammed in two contradictory ways and because the second sentence of the statute creates further confusion—the dissent argued the tie should go to the runner (or in this case, the respondent).

Takeaways for practitioners

• Legislative drafting critique: Both the majority and dissent took shots at the General Assembly’s handiwork. The majority noted the statute is not a masterclass in legislative drafting, while the dissent called parts of it incoherent. This serves as a reminder that statutory ambiguity is often a drafter’s error that becomes a litigator’s opportunity.

• Standard of proof for CPOs: This is a significant win for petitioners. Proving future mental distress (a belief that it will happen) is a different evidentiary burden than proving past or present mental distress, which often requires medical testimony or evidence of substantial incapacity.

• Visual advocacy is important: While it appeared in a dissent, the Chief Justice’s use of a diagram highlights the power of visual aids. If a statute is ambiguous enough to require a flowchart to understand, maybe that flowchart belongs in your merit brief.