Update: Read an analysis of the argument here.

On April 14, 2021, the Supreme Court of Ohio will hear oral argument in State of Ohio v. Manson M. Bryant,  2020-0599. At issue in this case is whether a defendant’s expletive laden outburst directed at the judge after his sentence was announced constitutes a lawful basis for the judge to increase the defendant’s sentence, or whether it should be solely punishable as contempt of court.

Case Background

In July of 2018, Bryant and an accomplice broke into the trailer of Arturo Gonzalez. Bryant’s accomplice held a gun to Gonzalez’s head, and he and Bryant left with cash, a laptop, a cell phone, and some jewelry. Bryant was indicted by the Lake County Grand Jury on seven counts, including aggravated burglary, kidnapping, abduction, and weapons charges. He was found guilty on all seven counts.

Initially, Lake County Common Pleas Judge Eugene A. Lucci sentenced Bryant to an aggregate term of twenty-two years. When Judge Lucci announced the sentence, Bryant became angry, let loose a torrent of cusswords at the judge and accused him of racism. The judge, responding directly to Bryant, stated, “When I said that you had a certain amount of remorse, I was mistaken,” and changed the sentences on two of the counts to the maximum sentence, effectively adding six years to Bryant’s sentence. Bryant appealed.

The Appeal

The Eleventh District affirmed Bryant’s sentence in a unanimous decision authored by Judge Cynthia Westcott Rice, and joined by Judges Matt Lynch and Mary Jane Trapp. The court relied on State v. Thompson and held that because the trial court could construe Bryant’s outburst as reflecting a lack of remorse, increasing Bryant’s sentence was not contrary to law. The court emphasized that the trial court could have held Bryant in direct contempt of court, but that because the judge’s oral pronouncement of Bryant’s sentence was not a final order, it was still within his discretion to increase Bryant’s sentence.

Key Statutes and Precedent

R.C. 2929.11 (When sentencing an offender for a felony, a court “shall be guided by the overriding purposes of protect[ing] the public from future crime by the offender and others . . . punish[ing] the offender, and . . . promot[ing] the effective rehabilitation of the offender . . .”)

R.C. 2929.12 (At sentencing, among other factors, whether the offender shows genuine remorse for the offense shall be used to consider whether the offender is, or is not, likely to commit future crimes.)

Denovchek v. Bd. of Trumbull Cty. Commrs., 16 Ohio St.3d 14 (1988) (Contempt of court is defined as “disobedience of an order of a court.”)

State v. Eckliffe, 2002-Ohio-7136 (11th Dist.) (The sentencing court is in the best position to determine whether a defendant’s statements indicate a lack of genuine remorse.)

State ex rel. Marshall v. Glavas, 2003-Ohio-857 (Oral pronouncements made by the court are subject to revision before journalization.)

State v. Mathis, 2006-Ohio-855 (A sentencing court has full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range.)

State v. Webster, 2008-Ohio-1636 (1st Dist.) (Contempt of court is always available to punish a defendant who disrupts proceedings with disrespectful behavior.)

State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002 (An appellate court may modify a sentence if it determines that the record does not support it by “clear and convincing evidence.”)

State v. Thompson, 2017-Ohio-1001 (11th Dist.) (It was lawful for a trial court to increase the defendant’s sentence by six months after he made a “vulgar, hostile comment” to the prosecutor after the conclusion of the sentencing hearing.)

State v. Johnson, 2019-Ohio-4668 (8th Dist.) (When modifying a sentence, an appellate court should give “substantial, but not unfettered, deference to the trial court’s judgment.”)

Votes to Accept the Case

Yes: Chief Justice O’Connor, and Justices Donnelly, Stewart, and French

No: Justices Kennedy, Fischer, and DeWine.

Bryant’s Proposition of Law Accepted for Review

A defendant’s disrespect towards the trial court, when done in response to a judicial ruling, is punishable as contempt of court, but does not provide a lawful basis for increasing the defendant’s sentence.

Bryant’s Argument

Bryant’s outburst should have been punished through contempt of court, and it was unlawful to increase his sentence based on the outburst. Bryant’s statements to the judge did not indicate a lack of remorse, but rather, shock and anger towards the court for its judgment. Because respect for the court is not itself a factor that a trial court is permitted to consider in sentencing, the six additional years imposed by the judge was unlawful.

Additionally, the Eleventh District’s reliance on State v. Thompson was misplaced because in Thompson, the defendant’s comments were directed at the prosecutor, not the judge, and were made after the conclusion of the sentencing hearing.

Further, the Eleventh District did not apply the correct standard of review to the trial court’s sentencing. The Eleventh District held that the trial court “could” have construed Bryant’s outburst as demonstrating a lack of remorse, but this provided too much deference to the trial court. Instead, the Eleventh District should have determined whether the record created a “firm belief or conviction” that the trial court’s modification was unlawful. The appellate court should have determined whether the record clearly and convincingly showed “no connection between Mr. Bryant’s behavior and his remorsefulness.” Because they did not, the Eleventh District deprived Bryant of meaningful appellate review. The Eleventh District’s decision should be reversed.

State’s Argument

Great deference should be given to the trial court’s sentencing determination. An appellate court may change a felony sentence on appeal “only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial court’s findings.” A statutory sentencing factor is lack of remorse, and the trial court could construe Bryant’s outburst as a sign that his previous statements of remorse were disingenuous, and instead were just reflections of his desire to receive leniency. The record in this case shows that Bryant’s sentence was based on his personal history and the facts of this case, and not as punishment for his outburst.

As in State v. Thompson, Bryant’s sentence was not final when he yelled at the judge. A sentence is only final upon issuance of the final order, and until it was journalized, the trial court can modify the sentence based on permissible factors. Because Bryant’s outburst could be construed to indicate a lack of remorse, and because remorse was the only mitigating factor at sentencing, the judge’s addition of six years was a lawful modification based on statutory factors made before the issuance of a final order. There is no indication from the record that the judge acted vindictively. Also, like Thompson, the court is not required to enter a contempt order. The court’s actions were consistent with law, and Bryant’s sentence should be affirmed.

Student Contributor: Liam McMillin