Update: On March 15, 2021, at the state’s request, this case was dismissed without prejudice.
Update: On December 22, 2020, the Court handed down a merit decision in State v. Turner, 2020-Ohio-6773. In a 5-2 opinion written by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices French, DeWine, Stewart and Donnelly, the Court held that driving on, but not over the outer edge white fog line is not a traffic violation. Justice Fischer dissented, joined by Chief Justice O’Connor.
On August 18, 2020, the Supreme Court of Ohio heard oral argument in State of Ohio v. Ryan Turner, 2019-1674. At issue in this case is whether a police officer has reasonable suspicion to stop a motorist for a marked lanes violation when a motorist drives on, but does not cross, a marked line.
Case Background
On August 7, 2018, Ryan Turner was charged with operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and (d), and with committing a marked lanes violation in violation of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1). The charges arose from an incident two days earlier, in which Turner was pulled over by an Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper after the officer observed Turner drive on the white fog line on the right side of State Route 74 in Clermont County. Turner pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to suppress, challenging the traffic stop. At the suppression hearing, the arresting trooper testified that he observed Turner’s sedan drift to the right, with the sedan’s two right tires touching, but not crossing, the white fog line on the right side of the road. The trooper initiated a traffic stop based solely on this, which he considered a marked lanes violation. The trooper did not observe Turner commit any other traffic violations.
The trial court granted Turner’s motion to suppress, finding that the traffic stop was based entirely on the observation that Turner’s tires touched the white fog line once, and held that a reasonably prudent officer in the same situation would not have believed probable cause existed for a violation of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1). In doing so, the trial court relied on State v. Shaffer from the 3rd District, which held that the “nearly as practicable” language in the statute “inherently contemplates some inevitable and incidental touching of the lane lines . . . during routine and lawful driving,” and therefore, driving on the lines without crossing does not constitute a marked lanes violation.
The Appeal
In a 2-1 decision, the Twelfth District reversed the trial court’s decision granting the motion to suppress. The majority found that the lane of travel ended at the leftmost edge of the white fog line. Therefore, if the tires of a vehicle touch the white fog line, the vehicle has left its lane, and therefore an officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver has violated R.C. 4511.33. The majority highlighted the specific language of R.C. 4511.33, and relied upon State v. Mays, holding that the statute “specifically provides that a vehicle is to be ‘driven, as nearly as practicable, entirely within a single lane or line of traffic’” (majority’s emphasis).
The majority found Mays more applicable than decisions from many of the other appellate districts in Ohio which have held that traveling on the center or fog line is not a marked lane violation Instead, the majority held that an officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motorist has violated R.C. 4511.33 when the officer observes the vehicle leave its lane of travel, which can occur when the tires of the vehicle touch the white fog line, since R.C. 4511.33 requires vehicles to stay entirely within the marked lane line. The majority also held that the requirement that a vehicle drive entirely within its lane of travel includes its fenders and side mirrors.
The dissent disagreed with the majority’s premise that a lane of travel begins to the immediate left of the fog line and highlights the difference between the white fog line and other traffic control devices, including markings placed on a street or road. The dissent refers to the Ohio Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (“OMUTCD”), which specifies that a solid white line delineates the “right hand edge of the roadway.” Because the OMUTCD specifies that a solid white line “delineates or prohibits crossing,” the white fog line is the right-hand edge of the right-hand lane of travel, and therefore the entire fog line is within the lane of travel. Thus, the dissent would uphold the motion to suppress because the boundary of the lane of travel is the rightmost edge of the white fog line, which means the wheels of the vehicle must cross the fog line for an officer to have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motorist has violated R.C. 4511.33.
The appeals court certified a conflict in the case. Read the oral argument preview of the case here.
Certified Conflict Question
“Does an officer have reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of a motor vehicle for a marked lanes violation under R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) when the officer observes the tires of a vehicle driving on, but not across a marked lane line?”
Certified Conflict Cases
State v. Williams, Hamilton No. C- 960958 (1st Dist. 1997) (When a motorist drove in a straight course with her right-side tires directly on, but not over, the white edge line, the officer did not have probable cause or reasonable and articulable suspicion to support a traffic stop.)
State v. Smith, 2017-Ohio-5845 (3rd Dist.) (An officer lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop when the driver touched but did not cross a white edge line.)
State v. Marcum, 2013-Ohio-2652 (5th Dist.) (A driver that travels completely over the marked lane violates the marked lanes statute.)
State v. Franklin, 2012- Ohio-3089 (5th Dist.) (An officer lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop when the driver drives on the center line, but not across it.)
State v. Richardson, Delaware No. 00-CA-A-01-003 (5th Dist. 2000) (Driving on top of the center line does not constitute a violation of R.C. 4511.33.)
State v. Konneh, 2018-Ohio-1239 (6th Dist.) (“[A] driver does not violate R.C. 4511.33 by weaving within one’s own lane or driving on the demarcating lines, but he does violate R.C. 4511.33 when he travels completely across the lane marking.”)
State v. Parker, 2013- Ohio-3470 (6th Dist.) (Evidence that a vehicle “sometimes traveled on the marked lanes” does not constitute a violation of R.C. 4511.33.)
State v. Baker, 2014-Ohio-2564 (6th Dist.) (The plain language of R.C. 4511.33 indicates that the statute is only violated if the motorist drives across the marked lane.)
State v. Grigoryan, 2010-Ohio-2883 (8th Dist.) (“Inconsequential movements within a lane,” including drifting from side to side and driving on the edge line, “does not give rise to articulable suspicion to make an investigatory stop under State v. Mays.”)
State v. Kneier, 2015-Ohio-3419 (11th Dist.) (Unless a vehicle’s tires have been observed to “actually cross over the marked line . . . a vehicle does not leave its lane of travel, and as a result, there is no marked lane violation supporting probable cause to stop.”)
Key Statutes and Precedent
U.S. Const. Amend. IV. (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”)
Ohio Const. Art. I, Sec. 14 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person and things to be seized.”)
R.C. 4511.19 (“No person shall operate any vehicle . . . within this state, if, at the time of operation,” the person is under the influence of alcohol.)
R.C. 4511.01(B)(B) (“Street” or “highway” means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way open to the use of the public as a thoroughfare for purposes of vehicular travel.)
R.C. 4511.01 (EE) (“Roadway” means that portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, except the berm or shoulder.)
R.C. 4511.01 (QQ) (“Traffic control device” includes “a marking…placed on a street, highway, private road open to public travel.”)
*R.C. 4511.33(A)(1)(“Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic . . . [a] vehicle . . . shall be driven, as nearly as is practicable, entirely within a single lane or line of traffic and shall not be moved from such lane or line until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.”)
Ohio Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices
Section 3A.05 Colors
Section 3A.06 Functions, Widths and Patterns of Longitudinal Pavement Markings (solid white lane marking “discourages or prohibits crossing.”)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968) (An officer needs to have “reasonable suspicion” that a crime is being, or has been, committed to conduct a search and seizure.)
State v. Jones, 88 Ohio St.3d 430, 727 N.E.2d 886 (2000) (A court must evaluate the “degree to which a governmental action intrudes upon a person’s liberty and privacy” and “the degree to which the intrusion is necessary for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”)
State v. Frazee, 2005-Ohio-3513 (12th Dist.) (An officer who observes a vehicle “drift within its lane of travel, touch the right fog line twice, and straddle the center line for a few seconds before moving into the left lane” has probable cause to stop the motorist.”)
*Bowling Green v. Godwin, 2006-Ohio-3563 (“An officer who personally observes a driver disregard a traffic-control device that complies with the Ohio Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices may have probable cause under the totality of the circumstances . . .”)
*State v. Mays, 2008-Ohio-4539 (“[A] traffic stop is constitutionally valid when a law-enforcement officer witnesses a motorist drift over the lane markings in violation of R.C. 4511.33, even without further evidence of erratic or unsafe driving.”(syllabus))
*State v. Shaffer, 2013-Ohio-3581 (3d Dist.) (The “nearly as is practicable” language in R.C. 4511.33 “inherently contemplates some inevitable and incidental touching of the lane lines by a motorist’s vehicle during routine and lawful driving, without the vehicle being considered to have left the lane of travel . . .”)
State v. Stover, 2017-Ohio-9097 (12th Dist.) (“Ohio recognizes two types of lawful traffic stops”: a non-investigatory stop based on a probable cause to stop because the officer observed a traffic violation; and, a Terry stop, where “the officer has reasonable suspicion based on specific or articulable facts that a criminal behavior is imminent or has occurred.”)
State v. Hairston, 2019-Ohio-1622 (“The reasonable-suspicion standard is less demanding than the probable cause standard when used analyzing an arrest.”)
*cited by counsel at argument
At Oral Argument
*Arguing Counsel
Zachary F. Faris, Faris & Faris LLC, Batavia, for Appellant Ryan Turner
Louis E. Grube, Paul W. Flowers Co., LPA, for Amicus Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, in Support of Appellant Ryan Turner
Nick Horton, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Clermont County, for Appellee State of Ohio
Stephen P. Carney, Deputy Solicitor General, Columbus, for Amicus Attorney General Dave Yost in support of the State of Ohio
*Mr. Faris shared argument time with Amicus Ohio Association of Criminal Defense. Mr. Horton shared argument time with Amicus Attorney General of Ohio
Turner’s Argument
The language of R.C. 4511.33, the definitions in R.C. 4511.01, relevant dictionary definitions, and case law throughout Ohio all support Turner’s suggested proposition of law that a motorist who touches, but does not cross, the lane line does not violate R.C. 4511.33 and does not give an officer reasonable, articulable suspicion for a stop.
If the Court finds that R.C. 4511.33 is ambiguous, the rule of lenity requires that the statute be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of Turner. That requires a finding that touching a line is not a violation of R.C. 4511.33.
A motorist remains in his lane when he touches the lane line. As the definitions in R.C. 4511.01 for “roadway” and “highway” make clear, the lane lines are part of the lane and can be driven on. The legislature specifically excluded the berm and the shoulder from roadways used for vehicular travel but did not exclude lane lines. Since the line can be traveled on, it is the outside edge of the line which marks the outside edge of the lane.
Contrary to what the appeals court majority found, the inside edge of the line is not the outside edge of the lane. A motorist traveling on the lane line is still driving on the inside or the inner side of the outside edge of the lane line and thus is in the lane. “Within,” for example, is defined as “not beyond,” which certainly suggests a motorist can travel on the line but cannot cross beyond the line. So, the statutory definition and the dictionary definition support Turner’s position. Every other appellate court outside the 12th district supports Turner’s position and even the 12th district decision was a split decision.
The Attorney General and the state argue reasonable mistake of law on the basis that the statute is ambiguous. Thus, they are admitting that R.C. 4511.33 does not clearly and unambiguously support their position. That leaves two options. Either the statute clearly supports Turner’s position which it does, and which appellate courts outside the 12th district have unanimously held, or the statute must be deemed ambiguous and must be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of Turner. The only way to do that would be to find that motorists are allowed to touch the lane lines.
Additionally, concerns about safety from the appeals court majority and from the state do not withstand scrutiny. Appellate courts have expressly allowed touching lane lines for up to 23 years in various districts throughout Ohio and there is no evidence that accidents have increased. A review of statewide crash data does not support these safety concerns. Simply because two motorists have the potential ability to occupy the same space doesn’t mean they can do so at the same time. Motorists can’t just run into one another. They would still have the duty to avoid any kind of accident, just as they do now.
An analogy about airline seats might be helpful. A passenger has a seat. If that passenger puts his or her arm on the armrest, that passenger is not now occupying two seats. An employee of the airline is not going to rush back and charge that passenger for another ticket for using two seats. But if that passenger’s hand drifts all the way across the armrest into the other person’s seat, now there is an issue.
Lane lines do not serve as buffers. That is not codified anywhere, nor is it found in the OMUTCD. The state seems to have invented that idea to support its argument here. There are many examples that show just the opposite, including the language in the OMUTCD, which makes clear that a motorist is allowed to touch the line, but not cross it. If lane lines are buffers, then the fog line in particular would actually serve to push traffic back toward the center, which would be more dangerous.
Lane lines are not required on one-lane roads, but one-lane roads often have lane lines. If they are not required on one lane roads, then they must not be required as buffers, but for some other reason like providing notice or warnings for motorists. Nor do parked cars and curbs replace edge lines. They are not part of the roadway, so they would be excluded by the definitions in R.C. 4511.01. Furthermore, a motorist can’t just ram his or her car into a curb or a parked car. If lane lines were buffers, we would want lane lines in those situations to keep motorists away from parked vehicles or from pedestrians on the sidewalk. But since they are explicitly not used in those situations, that again suggests that the reason for lane lines is not as buffers, but as something else.
Finally, the argument that if a tire is riding along the white line, then certain other parts of the vehicle are also over the line does not make sense. If that argument were to be accepted, big trucks and trailers would be committing a violation without even touching the line, and a lot of these vehicles wouldn’t even be allowed on the road because they would not fit. In addition, that would create a situation where police officers—and this is already a difficult situation for them—would have to imagine an invisible line down from the vehicle’s mirror to the ground to decide if there has been a marked lane violation. That’s simply impractical and would be unfair to drivers and to law enforcement and would keep many legitimate motorists off the road. All roads would have to be widened if that approach is taken.
Amicus Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers’ Argument
The Court need not answer the constitutional issue in the case, but if it does, the Association’s amicus brief provides an analysis of why the Ohio Constitution provides greater protection in this area than the U.S. Constitution. Additionally, a reasonable mistake of law does not render a stop reasonable if there was no violation of law.
It is important that the Court understand that contrary to the argument of the amicus Ohio Attorney General, this Court’s decision in Bowling Green v. Godwin was not a mistake of law case. It was simply a mistake of fact case. There was no question in that case that failure to observe a traffic control device was illegal under the Bowling Green Code. The issue in the case was whether there were six specific signs in one municipal lot, and the question was whether those specific signs were traffic control devices. There was a statute that required the city council to validate these signs. More to the point, this Court treated this as mistake of fact case and not a mistake of law case, and this Court should again treat it as such.
State’s Argument
This case is about giving meaning to the plain language used by the General Assembly in R.C. 4511.33 and especially to the phrase “entirely within a single lane.” The 12th district majority determined that phrase meant a vehicle must be driven completely on the inner side of the marked lane line so as not to touch the marked lane lines. This Court should affirm that decision because it is most closely aligned with the plain language and the intent of the statute.
There are two ways of interpreting the individual lines, as either part of a lane or as a sort of neutral or buffer zone. The plain language of the statute and the purpose of the statute indicate that the lines are the buffer zones or neutral zones rather than part of the lanes themselves. The purpose behind the lines is to prevent cars from inadvertently traveling within the path of another vehicle, or from inadvertently traveling on the side of the road into another vehicle or pedestrian. In other words, it prevents cars from inadvertently trying to share the same space. Construing the line as part of the lane itself would be inconsistent with the purpose of preventing this inadvertent sharing of the same space.
As for whether the line is included when the width of a lane is being measured, the only case that addressed this indicated that the lines were not part of the lanes because the addition of the edge lines and the center double yellow lines would reduce the overall width of the lane. The language itself indicates that the lines cannot be part of the lane because if both cars can touch the center dash line, then by traveling on the center dash line a car is traveling in both the right lane and the left lane, and cannot possibly be travelling entirely within a single lane.
Fog lines cannot be treated any differently for several reasons. Foremost is safety. Safety is no less an issue on the edge line than on the center dash line because the center dash line involves moving vehicles. It is easier for a moving vehicle to get out of the way of another vehicle that is encroaching on its territory than to avoid a broken down or stopped vehicle on the side of the road. The safety concerns are even more prevalent on the edge line, so it cannot be treated differently than the center line. This is also supported by the OMUTCD, because the center dash lines can be crossed, while the white edge line is supposed to discourage all crossing. It would not make sense to say that a motorist could not touch the center dash line—the very line it is allowed to cross—but is allowed to touch and ride on the edge line which is discouraged from being crossed. Also, there is no differentiation in R.C. 4511.33 between the center dash line and the white edge line and therefore interpreting it that way would be reading in a differentiation that is not present in the statute.
The OMUTCD can’t be used to define what is or is not a marked lanes violation because according to the manual, crossing the center dash lines or even crossing the white edge line would not be a violation. The only violation would be crossing the solid double yellow line or solid white line. When the solid white line is used as an edge line, it only discourages, but does not prohibit crossing. The manual never specifically says what part of the lane line markings are part of a lane and what are not. It cannot inform R.C. 4511.33 because under the OMUTCD crossing those lines would not be a violation. So, the most appropriate use of this line is to treat it as a buffer zone or a neutral zone which would create the space between the vehicles or the vehicle and anything on the side of the road. What the manual indicates is the white line may be substituted for curbs or parking. And clearly it is the inside edge of the curb or of the cars that delineate the outside edge of the lane. Therefore, it stands to reason that if those can substitute for a white line, they would also be the inside edge of the white line that constitutes the outside edge of the lane.
The problem with arguing that riding on the line is within a single lane because the vehicle has not yet breached into the adjacent area is it fails to give effect to the statutory word “entirely.” Driving on the line cannot be both driving within the lane and entirely within the lane because that reads the word “entirely” out of the statute.
Amicus Ohio Attorney General’s Argument
It is the Attorney General’s position that driving on the line is a violation of the statute, and even if it isn’t the stop was still reasonable because the officer made a reasonable mistake about the law.
First, a quick point about lenity. Lenity doesn’t apply here because it is a last resort only if there is ambiguity, which the text entirely resolves in this case, and also because lenity is about giving the defendant a break on a conviction. Lenity does not apply in the context of whether the violation serves as reasonable suspicion. And this Court has already said in the Godwin case that a reasonable mistake does justify a stop, which clearly suggests it was a mistake of law case. Nor is there any difference in reasonableness between a factual mistake and a legal mistake in this context.
In regard to the “nearly as practicable” language in the manual, one thing the manual does say is to delineate “separation of traffic.” The key word there is “separation.” There is no separation in a shared space. That is inviting disaster. But with a buffer zone, traffic is being separated.
In discouraging crossing lane lines, there’s a difference when saying drivers should be given some wiggle room to cross for deliberate safety reasons, like avoiding a deer in the roadway. Or if a driver just needs to make a turn the driver may do so if done deliberately, and not because of mere inattentiveness or carelessness, or as in this case, drunkenness. The allowance that is given is for deliberate actions. A driver is allowed to cross when it is warranted by the facts, but free drifting is not permitted.
In a situation like this, a bright line rule is easier to apply. Was the line touched, or not? For simplicity only tires are considered, but realistically, if what is pictured is not just a stripe, but a plane in space, as if there were a wall there, a car’s bumpers and side view mirrors are actually several inches over the line by the time the tires are touching the line. So, touching the line actually means that in space, the car is over the line.
The fact that there are so many appellate court decisions about merely touching the lines says something about the honesty of the officers across the state who openly admit that a driver just touched but did not cross the lane line. Just as with any area of law, a bright line is easier to apply. The state’s position actually serves the purpose of clarity and doesn’t eat away at it.
What Was On Their Minds
Ohio Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices
Does the OMUTCD impart knowledge as to what exactly the lane is, asked Justice Kennedy? Isn’t that the whole purpose of this manual and all the provisions and markings that go into a roadway? Isn’t that really defining the space where cars have to stop or operate within? She added that this manual was created pursuant to the Federal Highway Administration system and is uniform across the United States so that the lines will mean the same thing in every state. Where does the manual discuss or define the inside edge? Doesn’t Section 3A.05 really talk about the delineation of colors and why certain colors are used on a roadway to demark certain areas as passable or prohibiting? But it’s really the functionality, isn’t it, of the longitudinal line when you get to Section 3A.06 where again it says the general function and as it relates to the solid white line, the fog line, it discourages or prohibits the crossing. Doesn’t that really lead to the conclusion that the lane includes the line?
Center Lines, Lane Lines, Fog Lines
Are the lane lines really in both lanes, asked Justice DeWine? Is the painted stripe in the center line in both lanes? Is it kind of a no-man’s land that is in both lanes? If that is the case, then how does the language that says you have to drive entirely within one lane make sense? Isn’t the definition and the prohibition the same for both the center lines and the fog lines?
How are the fog lines implicated, asked Justice Fischer?
When the width of a lane is being measured, is the line included or not included, asked Chief Justice O’Connor? Isnt it a fact that if a tire is riding along the white line, that part of the car is over the line?
The dash line represents a permissive condition where cars may pass safely and the violation of that causing an accident may be something else because it is a permissive condition, commented Justice Kennedy, adding that was not what was represented here.
The context here is that a driver is being stopped because he put a part of a tire on the fog line, noted Justice French, adding that she was concerned about the broader implications of saying that anybody can be stopped simply because part of their tire drifted onto a fog line. What are the broader implications of this?
Safety Concerns
How safe is it to say it is permissible for cars to be driving on the center line both north and south or east and west in opposite directions, asked Chief Justice O’Connor? Who would have the right of way if two cars are positioned on the same line? If there were an accident, how could we tell which one was liable if they both had a right to be there?
Language in R.C. 4511.33
Immediately before the word “entirely” is “as nearly as is practicable,” commented Justice French. Doesn’t that somehow modify the word “entirely”?
How it Looks from the Bleachers
To Professor Emerita Marianna Bettman
I found this one harder to call than my student contributor Liam McMillan did. The questioning suggests the Chief and Justice DeWine favor the state, while Justices French and Kennedy (Yes! Justice Kennedy! I don’t know if she is now routinely finally starting to ask questions, but this is the first time I have ever heard her do so) seem to favor Turner. The outcome may well turn on whether a majority agrees with the distinction made by the dissenting judge in the 12th district—that a broken white line separating lanes of traffic in the same direction has a different function than the fog line, which delineates the right-hand edge of the road. Or in other words, the outcome may turn on whether the Court buys a distinction between types of lines.
I found this argument hard to follow to and to present coherently on the blog. At times, it was difficult to differentiate between “lane” and “line” from the audio, and to follow the questioning about specific provisions of the OMUTCD, particularly by Justice Kennedy, who really got into the weeds with parts of the manual. I also agree with Liam that this case isn’t going to be decided on any constitutional basis, or for that matter, on mistake of law either, which the appeals court did not find it necessary to address.
With a tip of the hat to the decision I evidentially wrote years ago while on the First District, State v. Williams (the oldest of the conflict cases), and because I completely agree with the concerns raised by Justice French on the broader context here, I’m also going to call this for Turner. I still haven’t changed my mind that tires on, but not crossing the edge line, standing alone, do not provide reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop (I mean, c’mon, who hasn’t routinely done that?).
To Student Contributor Liam McMillan
I think it is unlikely that the Court will side with the sole outlier district in this case and will rule in favor of Ryan Turner. Mr. Turner’s attorney, Zachary Faris, presented a clear and structured argument, much of which the justices allowed him to deliver uninterrupted. Save for a stumble responding to Chief Justice O’Connor, Faris stuck to his script and, in my mind, provided adequate responses to potential and actual arguments from the State. In the eyes of the Court, the biggest hole in Turner’s argument is the fact that Turner’s drawing of the line creates a situation where the painted line can simultaneously be in two lanes. While Faris (I believe rightfully) argues that there are serious distinctions between the fog line and the center line, the Court did not seem unanimously convinced of this.
Louis Grube, sharing time with Faris on behalf of the Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, argued succinctly that Bowling Green v. Godwin does not apply in this case. The justices had no questions for him, indicating to me either full agreement, or, potentially more likely, that this case will be decided on the drawing of the lines, not the constitutional argument.
For the State, Nick Horton presented his “plain language” case to a somewhat more active bench than his opposing counsel met. The Court seemed less inclined to accept his argument on its face, and spent more time in the details of the Ohio Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices. At times, Horton traded paragraphs back-and-forth with Justice Kennedy, who seemed to have spent ample time in its pages before the argument. Perhaps most noteworthy, Horton appeared to concede his own point in an exchange with Justice Kennedy, saying that the manual “discourages, but doesn’t prohibit crossing” the painted line.
Stephen Carney for the Ohio Attorney General shared some of Horton’s time, and made an argument focused on an officer’s mistake of law compared to a mistake of fact. Carney responded well to Justice French’s constitutional questions surrounding Terry. He also brought up an interesting approach about drawing a plane up from the painted line, inferring that if the tires of a vehicle touched the line, other parts of that vehicle would necessarily be crossing a vertical plane drawn up from that painted line. (While not raised by Faris on rebuttal, I’m not sure Carney’s geometry makes the task at hand any easier, because the question then becomes, “where do we draw the vertical line?”).
I think this case will likely be decided on the basis of where to draw the line, and the Court will not feel the need to rule explicitly on the constitutional questions. Most likely, in my mind, the Court will rule in favor of Turner, reversing the appellate court’s outlier decision, and maintain the status quo that, in Ohio, a driver whose tires touch a lane line, but do not cross it, has not committed a marked lanes violation.