Update: On December 21, 2020, the Court dismissed this case as improvidently certified.

Read the analysis of the argument here.

Update: On July 17, 2020, the Court granted a continuance in the oral argument of this case until August 18, 2020.

On July 22, 2020, the Supreme Court of Ohio will hear oral argument in State of Ohio v. Christian Carlisle, 2019-1700. At issue in this case is whether R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) unconstitutionally violates the separation of powers doctrine.

Case Background

On June 23, 2018, Christian Carlisle was terminated from his job at Wal-Mart. After his termination, Carlisle set a fire in the Wal-Mart store and was consequently charged with aggravated arson, arson, and inducing panic. After Carlisle pleaded guilty to arson, Willoughby Municipal Court Judge Marisa L. Cornachio sentenced him to 180 days in jail, with 90 days suspended, 12-months community control, and a $250 fine. Both Carlisle and the prosecutor requested that the trial court require Carlisle to register as an Arson Offender for only ten years, rather than for his lifetime. However, Judge Cornachio disregarded the joint request and ordered Carlisle to register as an arson offender for life. Carlisle appealed the trial court’s mandatory lifetime registration order.

The Appeal

In a 2-1 decision written by Judge Cynthia Westcott Rice, and joined by Judge Matt Lynch, the Eleventh District affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court found that the statutory registration requirements are not part of a criminal sentence and therefore declined to apply a felony-sentencing standard of review to the registration requirement.

Additionally, despite Carlisle’s failure to raise the issue below, the Eleventh District held that R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. In so holding, the court noted that the General Assembly has created a number of mandatory registries in which the  judiciary does not have the inherent discretion to determine whether an offender should register, or unhindered discretion to determine the length of time during which an offender must register. Requiring that the prosecutor and investigating agency request a shortened registration period before a court may consider shortening the period does not interfere with or remove a court’s discretion because the executive branch’s request does not bind the court to any decision. The executive branch’s request is simply a precondition, or catalyst, for the trial court’s discretion, which does not infringe upon the judicial branch’s authority.

Judge Mary Jane Trapp concurred in part and dissented in part. While concurring with the majority’s decision to sua sponte certify a conflict with the Fourth District, Judge Trapp dissented because she would find that R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) violates the separation of powers doctrine. By depriving the trial court of the unfettered ability to consider a reduced registration period, Judge Trapp believes that the statute in question compromises the independence of the judiciary.

The Eleventh District sua sponte certified a conflict between its decision and the Fourth District’s opinion in State v. Dingus, 2017-Ohio-2619 (4th Dist.).

Votes to Accept the Case

Yes: Justices Kennedy, Fischer, DeWine, Donnelly, and Stewart

No: Chief Justice O’Connor and Justice French

Certified Conflict Question

Does R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) unconstitutionally violate the doctrine of separation of powers?

Certified Conflict Case

State v. Dingus, 2017-Ohio-2619 (4th Dist.) (R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) unconstitutionally violates the separation-of-powers doctrine because the statute did not allow the trial court to consider reducing an arson offender’s registration period without the authorization of the executive branch.)

Key Statutes and Precedent

R.C. 2909.15(A)(1)-(2) (Mandatory Registration Statute for Arson Offenders) (Any arson offender must register with the sheriff’s office in the county where they live within ten days of being classified as an arson offender or within ten days of being released from incarceration.)

R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) (Registry Reduction Statute)(The registration requirement shall continue for the rest of the arson offender’s life. However, the trial court may reduce the registration period to a minimum of ten years if the prosecutor and investigating agency so request.)

State v. Collier, 62 Ohio St.3d 267 (1991) (“[I]f at all possible, statutes must be construed in conformity with the Ohio and the United States Constitutions.”)

State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404 (1998) (A court may declare a statute unconstitutional only if it “appear[s] beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly incompatible.”)

State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d 451 (1999) (Courts must “jealously guard the judicial power against encroachment from the other two branches of government and conscientiously perform [their] constitutional duties and continue [their] most precious legacy.”)

State ex rel. Bray v. Russell, 89 Ohio St.3d 132 (2000) (The judicial power rests exclusively in the judicial branch, and the courts’ authority in that area shall not be infringed upon.)

Norwood v. Horney, 2006-Ohio-3799 (The separation of powers doctrine governs the constitutional allocation of power within our tripartite government.)

State v. Reed, 2014-Ohio-5463 (11th Dist.) (The General Assembly’s intent regarding R.C. 2909.15 is civil, not punitive.)

State v. Romage, 2014-Ohio-783 (Statutes receive a “strong presumption of constitutionality.”)

State v. Jirousek, 2015-Ohio-949 (11th Dist.) (Mandatory registration orders are not part of the sentence imposed in a criminal proceeding.)

Carlisle’s Argument

The Court must answer the certified question in the affirmative.

R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) mandates that arson offenders must register for the rest of their lives. However, the statute includes an exception to this mandatory lifetime registration order. If the trial judge receives a request from the prosecutor and the investigating enforcement agency asking the trial judge to consider limiting the arson offender’s registration period, then the trial judge may limit an arson offender’s registration period to a minimum of ten years. This exception violates the separation of powers doctrine because the statute restricts the trial court’s ability to impose a reduced registration period on an arson offender.

The separation of powers doctrine defines the scope of authority that each branch of government possesses. To preserve each branch’s independence and integrity, the individual branches of government may not encroach upon each other. For example, the legislative and executive branches of government may not interfere with the judicial branch’s power to determine a defendant’s guilt.

R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) violates the separation of powers doctrine because the statute limits the judicial branch’s powers of determining guilt in a criminal case and sentencing a defendant convicted of a crime. Arson-offender registration is punitive. As such, determining whether to impose a mandatory lifetime registration versus a mandatory ten-year minimum registration involves the judicial power of sentencing. By mandating that the trial court may consider a reduced reporting period only if the prosecutor and investigating law enforcement agency so request, the statute compromises the trial court’s independence and allows the executive branch to unconstitutionally encroach upon the trial court’s exercise of judicial authority at sentencing. Because the trial court cannot act without the prosecutor’s agreement, the statute violates the court’s ability to sentence defendants, thereby violating the separation of powers doctrine.

Additionally, R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) violates the separation of powers doctrine because the statute violates the judicial branch’s power of appellate review of a trial court decision. The statute makes the prosecutor and investigating law enforcement agency’s decision final and non-appealable. The separation of powers doctrine requires that appellate jurisdiction remain within the judicial branch. The statute here gives the prosecuting attorney the power to make a decision that prejudices the defendant without any opportunity for review. More specifically, the statute allows a prosecutor to unilaterally prevent a defendant from requesting a non-lifetime registration period, without any opportunity for a court to reverse or review that decision. Because the statute allows the executive branch to make a final, non-appealable decision, R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) is unconstitutional.

Because the exception contained in R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) is unconstitutional, that portion of the statute must be severed. The discretion to grant a reduced registration period should rest entirely with the trial court, not with the prosecutor and investigating law enforcement agency. To preserve the separation of powers doctrine, this Court should hold that R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) is unconstitutional and sever the offending portion of the statute.

State’s Argument

R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) is constitutional because the legislature possesses the long-held authority to legislate criminal offenses and determine the appropriate punishment for such offenses. The legislature is the ultimate determiner of public policy and has the power to create and refine laws to meet the needs of Ohio citizens.

Additionally, a strong presumption of validity exists for every statute enacted by the legislature. The statute here neither involves determining the guilt of a defendant nor affects a defendant’s right to judicial review. Rather, this statute—like Ohio statutes that mandate registrations for sexual offenders—simply imposes a registration requirement for arson offenders. Here, the defendant could have, but did not, appeal the fact the trial court abused its discretion in failing to follow the prosecutor’s recommendation of a reduced registration period. The enactment of this statute was a proper exercise of legislature authority.

A trial court does not have the inherent constitutional right to determine sentencing in all respects. For example, this Court has previously upheld the legislature’s authority to impose strict sentencing guidelines upon trial courts. Judicial discretion pertains to a court’s power to determine facts, admit evidence, and preside over other facets of litigation. Judicial discretion does not extend to overruling the proper exercise of legislative action.

In this case, the judicial branch must protect the legislative branch from encroachment by the judiciary. Because it is within the power of the legislature to mandate a life-time registration for arson offenders, R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) is constitutional and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.

Carlisle’s Proposed Proposition of Law

R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) violates the separation of powers doctrine by violating the judicial power to determine guilt in a criminal matter and sentence a defendant convicted of a crime and the judicial power to conduct appellate review.

Amicus in Support of the State

Ohio Attorney General

Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost filed an amicus brief in support of the State. As Ohio’s chief law enforcement officer, the Attorney General has an interest in protecting Ohio’s Constitution from misconstruction and in preserving the separation of powers doctrine. The Attorney General will share oral argument time with the State.  

Carlisle has no standing to challenge the statute because he suffered no injury from the statute. Namely, the prosecutor in Carlisle’s case requested a reduced registration period, but the trial judge disregarded the request. Because the trial judge—not the statute—prevented Carlisle from receiving less than a lifetime reporting requirement, Carlisle had no standing to challenge R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b).

Even if Carlisle has standing, the statute is constitutional because Ohio’s Constitution allows the legislature to play a role during the sentencing of criminal defendants. While only the judiciary can determine guilt of the accused, the judiciary does not have unfettered and ultimate discretion to decide which consequences must attach to a criminal conviction. Rather, the legislature possesses the power to enact rules by which the judiciary must resolve the cases before it. And the executive branch also has a role in determining the consequences of guilt when making charging and plea decisions. Because R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) simply guides the court in its resolution of cases, the statute is constitutional.

Because Carlisle lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute, this Court should dismiss the case. But if the Court reaches the merits of the case, then the Court should hold that R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) is constitutional and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.

Ohio Attorney General’s Proposed Counter Proposition of Law 1

Defendants lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of statutes that do not injure them.

Ohio Attorney General’s Proposed Counter Proposition of Law 2

The General Assembly does not invade the judicial power when it makes the courts’ power to enter a reduced sentenced contingent on an executive actor’s recommending a reduced sentence.

Student Contributor: Maria Ruwe