Update: On November 12, 2020 the Supreme Court of Ohio handed down a merit decision in this case.  Read the analysis here.

On June 2, 2020, the Supreme Court of Ohio will hear oral argument in City of Centerville v. Michael P. Knab, 2019-0873. At issue in this case is whether a municipality is a “victim” under Article I, Section 10a of the Ohio Constitution and is entitled to restitution when it is directly and proximately harmed by a criminal act.

Case Background

On April 3, 2018, Michael P. Knab called 9-1-1 and reported that there was an active shooter at his residence and that someone had been shot. After several officers from the Centerville Police Department responded to Knab’s residence, they were informed by Knab’s mother and friend that there was neither an active shooter nor an injured person present. The officers’ subsequent search of the residence confirmed that Knab’s report of an active shooter was false. Knab was charged with making a false report to a law enforcement agency and improper use of a 9-1-1 system and was subsequently found guilty by Judge James F. Long of the Kettering Municipal Court. Judge Long held a restitution hearing and ordered Knab to pay $1,375.56 in restitution to the Centerville Police Department.

Knab appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay restitution to the Centerville Police Department.

The Appeal

In a unanimous decision authored by Judge Jeffery M. Welbaum, and joined by judges Mary E. Donovan and Michael T. Hall, the Second District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision awarding restitution to the Centerville Police Department. The Second District concluded that governmental agencies in general, responding in their official capacities, and the Centerville Police Department in particular in this case do not qualify as a “victims” to whom restitution may be ordered. The court found that while Marsy’s Law does expand the definition of “victim,” it does not expressly authorize courts to designate law enforcement agencies as victims entitled to restitution for their official duties. The court reasoned that, absent explicit statutory language providing that governmental agencies can be characterized as victims, a judicial ruling cannot rewrite the statute to provide for such characterization. 

Votes to Accept the Case

Yes: Chief Justice O’Connor and Justices Kennedy*, French*, and Fischer*.

*Justices Kennedy, French, and Fischer would accept the appeal on both propositions of law.

No: Justices DeWine, Donnelly, and Stewart.

Centerville’s First Proposition of Law Accepted for Review

A municipality qualifies as a “victim” under the Ohio Constitution’s Bill of Rights, at Article I, Section 10a, known as Marsy’s Law, and is entitled to “full and timely restitution” when it is “directly and proximately harmed” by the commission of a criminal offense or act.

Centerville’s Second Proposition of Law Not Accepted for Review

The loss of man-hours a municipality incurs when it responds to a false report to a law enforcement agency, in violation of R.C. § 2917.32(A)(3), including wages paid to responding officers, are a loss of municipal resources, a “direct and proximate harm,” and an “economic loss” for which a municipality is entitled to “restitution” under Ohio Law.

Key Statutes and Precedent

Ohio Constitution, Article 1, Section 10(a) (Marsy’s Law) (“ . . . ‘victim’ means a person against whom the criminal offense or delinquent act is committed or who is directly and proximately harmed by the commission of the offense or act.”)

R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) (A court may impose sanctions in the form of restitution to be paid by the offender to the victim of the criminal activity but does not define victim.)

R.C. 2930.01(H)(1) (A victim is defined as “a person who is identified as the victim of a crime . . . in a police report or in a complaint, indictment, or information that charges the commission of a crime and that provides the basis for the criminal prosecution.”)

Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119 (2003). (Presumption that statutory use of the term “person” extends beyond natural persons  to include private and municipal corporations also, unless history and context of the statute point to a more limited use of the term and exclusion of municipal corporations.)

State v. Carswell, 2007-Ohio-3723 (the general rule as to the interpretation of constitutional amendments is that the drafters and the voters who approved it were aware of existing Ohio law.)

State v. Christian, 2014-Ohio-2672 (2^nd Dist.) (“Without specific expression of such an intent, [the Court] cannot conclude that the legislature intended to make law enforcement or other governmental agencies, whose only involvement in the reported crime is their response to it in their official capacities, eligible for restitution.”)

State v. Turner, 2018-Ohio-2860 (2^nd Dist.) (As a general rule, “governmental agencies are not victims of crimes to which they respond in their official capacities.”)

Centerville’s Argument  

The City of Centerville (“Centerville”) is a victim entitled to full and timely restitution under Marsy’s Law because it suffered direct and proximate harm as a result of Knab’s criminal acts and is an entity against whom the criminal offense was committed. Centerville is not ineligible for restitution merely because it was acting in its governmental capacity.

Although there is no set standard of review for restitution orders in misdemeanor cases, this case raises a question of law and, thus, should be reviewed de novo. As such, deference should be given to the trial court’s finding of fact that Knab’s crime was the direct and proximate cause of harm to Centerville. However, no deference should be given to the Second District’s determination as a matter of law that Centerville is not a victim entitled to restitution.

Marsy’s Law was established to protect victim’s rights as vigorously as the rights of those accused of a crime, including the right to full and timely restitution. Article I, Section 10a(d) of the Ohio Constitution defines victim as “a person against whom the criminal offense or criminal act is committed or who is directly and proximately harmed by the offense or act.” This law is self-executing and supersedes all conflicting state laws.

To interpret the terms in the Ohio Constitution properly, the Court should consider their common and ordinary meaning. Applying such a construction, a municipality should be considered a victim if a criminal offense is committed against it or if it is directly or proximately harmed by the offense.

Rather than relying on the definition of victim provided in the Ohio Constitution, the Second District turned to pre-Marsy statutes and case law and improperly limited the definition of victim. In holding that Centerville could be a victim of offenses such as embezzlement or vandalism but could not be a victim in its efforts to fight crime, the Second District ignored the broadened constitutional definition of victim that includes those who have been directly and proximately harmed by the commission of an offense.

Further, Marsy’s Law makes no distinction as to the capacity in which the victim was harmed. Knab’s argument that Centerville could not be a victim when acting in a governmental capacity is inconsistent with both the text of Marsy’s Law and the facts of this case.

Knab and the Second District have asserted that harm suffered in the exercise of governmental functions, such as law enforcement, is outside the scope of restitution; however, Marsy’s Law establishes no such limitation. Centerville was harmed by Knab’s actions because resources that would have otherwise been used differently were diverted to investigate Knab’s false report. Thus, Centerville was directly and proximately harmed by Knab’s offense and is eligible for full and timely restitution as a victim. To hold otherwise is in direct opposition to the Ohio Constitution.

Additionally, Centerville qualifies as a victim because Centerville was the entity against whom the crime was committed. Knab was charged with making a false report to a law enforcement agency. Thus, the agency receiving the false report is the victim of such a crime.

Marsy’s Law places no exceptions or limitations on a municipality’s ability to be characterized as a victim due to the capacity in which it serves. Because there are no statutes expressly limiting municipalities’ rights under Marsy’s Law, the Second District’s decision should be reversed, and Centerville should be characterized as a victim entitled to restitution.

Knab’s Argument

The Second District’s decision should be affirmed because a municipality is not a “person” and is not entitled to restitution under Article I, Section 10a of the Ohio Constitution. Unlike private corporations, municipal corporations are political in nature and are not entitled to all the protections afforded by the Ohio Constitution. For the purposes of Article I, Section 10a, a municipal corporation is a governmental body that is not entitled to restitution.

The plain and ordinary meaning of “person” as used in Article I, Section 10a does not include municipalities. The dictionary definition of “person” focuses on human beings. Although some definitions of “person” include corporations, these definitions refer to private corporations rather than municipalities.

The statutory definition of “person” also excludes municipalities. Certain chapters and titles of the Ohio Revised Code explicitly broaden the definition of “person” to include a political subdivision or government entity. This would not be necessary if “person” included municipalities. As an example, throughout Title VII of the Ohio Revised Code the General Assembly uses “person” to refer to entities that are different from municipalities, demonstrating that the General Assembly considers a municipality to be legally distinct from a person.

Public statements made by proponents of Article I, Section 10a indicate that “person” was defined according to its plain and ordinary meaning in the context of the amendment. These statements focused on the amendment’s benefits to human victims of crime and only discussed municipalities as part of the problem Article I, Section 10a would remedy.

The structure of Article I, Section 10a indicates that municipalities are government actors rather than victims. Because municipal prosecutors represent the government in criminal proceedings, municipalities already have access to many of the procedural rights Article I, Section 10a affords victims.

The structure of the Ohio Constitution indicates that a municipality is a government actor, not a person for constitutional purposes. The Ohio Constitution separates the rights of municipal corporations in Article XVIII from the rights of people in Article I. Further, while the Ohio Constitution defines a person’s rights in terms of what the government cannot do to a person, the Ohio Constitution does not protect municipal corporations from government interference, but rather defines a municipal corporation’s authority in affirmative terms.

Although municipalities are not victims, municipalities that experience direct and proximate harm are adequately protected under existing law. Municipalities may seek restitution where their proprietary, rather than governmental, interests have been harmed.

To gain greater access to municipal restitution, Centerville should ask the General Assembly to expand the definition of victim through legislation.

Amici in Support of Knab

American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation

The American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization devoted to protecting the basic civil rights and liberties of all Americans, including the constitutional right to petition one’s government for emergency and non-emergency municipal services.

The Second District’s decision should be affirmed. Centerville’s interpretation of Article I, Section 10a would discourage people from calling 911 and harm police-community relations. Additionally, Centerville’s interpretation expands Marsy’s law so that any offense triggers a municipal restitution claim and allows municipalities to use Marsy’s law to impose a tax through the criminal justice system.

Southeastern Ohio Legal Services, et. al.

Southeastern Ohio Legal Services is joined by Legal Aid Society of Columbus, Community Legal Aid Services, Inc., The Legal Aid Society of Cleveland, Legal Aid Society of Southwest Ohio, LLC, Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, Inc., Legal Aid of Western Ohio, Inc., Ohio Domestic Violence Network, and Ohio Alliance to End Sexual Violence in supporting the argument of Knab. The amici are non-profit organizations that provide legal services to low income clients and to victims of crimes such as domestic and sexual violence – clients who could be significantly affected by a decision allowing municipalities to collect restitution.

The Second District’s decision should be upheld. Finding municipalities to be “victims” entitled to restitution would be contrary to the intended function of Marsy’s Law and public policy. Cities would increase efforts to charge crimes because of their potential as a revenue source, thus, harming low income and disabled individuals who are most likely to be charged. True victims would be awarded less money because restitution would be shared with municipalities. Finally, low level offenders would have a more difficult time having their records sealed due to an inability to pay, making their reentry to society even more challenging.

Student Contributors: Madeline Pinto and Chelsea Rush