Update: On December 3, 2020, the Supreme Court of Ohio handed down a merit decision in this case.  Read the analysis here.

Read the analysis of the argument here.

On April 29, 2020, the Supreme Court of Ohio will hear oral argument in In re: M.H., 2019-0621. At issue in this case is whether a juvenile’s confession was involuntarily made and should be suppressed.  The case was supposed to be argued at Buckeye Local High School in Jefferson County, as part of the Court’s off-site program, but cannot be held there because of the coronavirus. The case will be argued remotely via videoconferencing, with the justices hearing argument from their individual chambers at the Court. 

Case Background

On December 2, 2015, in response to a referral to the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”) regarding an alleged rape, a CCDCFS social worker interviewed M.H., a thirteen-year-old child. During the interview, M.H. admitted that he had had sex with his twelve-year-old “half-sister.”

Before the interview, M.H.’s mother did not know the reason for the interview but had some suspicions about what was going on. M.H.’s mother drove M.H. to the interview, which took place inside a government building. When they arrived, the social worker took M.H. to a private room where she interviewed him for forty minutes. Other than the social worker and M.H., no one else was present inside that room.

On August 24, 2016, M.H. was charged in Juvenile Court with two counts of rape and two counts of gross sexual imposition. The State filed a motion in limine to use M.H.’s admissions from the interview. M.H. filed a motion to suppress his statements. Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court Judge Alison Floyd granted M.H.’s motion.

The Appeal

In a split decision authored by Judge Tim McCormack, and joined by Judge Kathleen Ann Keough, who wrote a separate opinion, the Eighth District reversed the trial court’s decision to suppress M.H.’s statements made to the social worker. In so holding, the majority, while acknowledging it found the totality of the circumstances here troubling, found that M.H. was not subjected to custodial interrogation as contemplated by Miranda. First, the court ruled that the social worker was not an agent of law enforcement. Second, the court found that M.H. was not in custody because he had not been restrained and a reasonable juvenile in his circumstances would have felt free to leave the interview. Additionally, the majority held that M.H.’s statements were freely and voluntarily made and therefore no due process violation had occurred.

Judge Keough wrote separately to express her concerns over the social worker’s role in this situation, and the information that a parent or guardian of a child suspected of a sex offense should receive. She would find that a reasonable person in the mother’s situation would not have understood the circumstances surrounding the interview. She also saw the potential for abuse by law enforcement in using social workers as their agents to obtain information they could not get so easily.

Judge Larry A. Jones dissented. He would have affirmed the trial court’s judgment to suppress M.H.’s statements to the social worker because the social worker was acting as the functional equivalent of law enforcement. Further, Judge Jones noted that credible evidence in the record suggested that M.H.’s due process rights had been violated and that his statements should be inadmissible.

Votes to Accept the Case

Yes: Chief Justice O’Connor* and Justices Donnelly,** Stewart,**Fischer, and French

*Chief Justice O’Connor would accept the appeal on proposition of law Nos. II and III only.

**Justices Donnelly and Stewart would accept the appeal on all propositions of law.

No: Justices Kennedy and DeWine

M.H.’s First Proposition of Law Accepted for Review

The statement of a child to a government social worker may be involuntary and violate due process even when the government social worker was not required to give Miranda warnings.

M.H.’s Second Proposition of Law Accepted for Review

A child does not feel free to leave when he is driven to a government agency for questioning by a parent and separated from that parent and interrogated in a private interrogation room without being told he is free to leave and free to not cooperate.

M.H.’s Third Proposition of Law Accepted for Appeal

A child-suspect must be provided Miranda warnings when that child is interrogated by a social worker who is exercising her statutory duty to investigate child abuse allegations and does so cooperatively with the police on a regular and institutional basis.

M.H.’s Fourth Proposition of Law Not Accepted for Appeal

Where a trial court makes alternative findings in support of a ruling and each is independently sufficient to use as a basis for its ruling, a court of appeals shall not review a finding that was not challenged on appeal.

Key Statutes and Precedent

U.S. Constitution, Amendment V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . .”)

R.C. 2151.421 (A social worker who knows, or has reasonable cause to suspect, that a child has suffered or is threatened by any physical or mental abuse shall immediately report that knowledge to the appropriate authority.)

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (“[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”)

State v. Bolan, 27 Ohio St.2d 15 (1971) (A social worker is an agent of law enforcement where the social worker acts under the direction or control of law enforcement.)

State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31 (1976) (When considering whether a statement was voluntarily given, courts should examine the totality of the circumstances, which include “the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity, and frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence of threat or inducement.”)

California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 121 (1983) (The ultimate inquiry about whether a suspect was in custody at the time of the interrogation is whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.)

State v. Foust, 2004-Ohio-7006 (holding that Miranda requires that law enforcement officers and their agents inform a suspect that: (1) he has the right to remain silent; (2) his statements may be used against him at trial; (3) he has the right to have an attorney present during questioning; and (4) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed.)

State v. Hoffner, 2004-Ohio-3430 (In determining whether an individual is in custody for Miranda purposes, “courts must first inquire into the circumstances surrounding the questioning and second, given those circumstances, determine whether a reasonable person would have felt that he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interview and leave.”)

State v. Jones, 2004-Ohio-5205 (8th Dist.) (“[I]n certain circumstances a social worker may be required to provide Miranda warnings, i.e., when acting as an agent of the police.”)

State v. Coonrod, 2010-Ohio-1102 (12th Dist.) (“In general, Ohio courts have held that social workers have no duty to provide Miranda warnings because they are private individuals without the power to arrest.”)

Howes v. Fields, 132 S.Ct. 1181 (2012) (In resolving the issue of custody, courts consider certain factors relevant to this determination: (1) the location of the questioning; (2) the duration of the questioning; (3) statements made during the interview; (4) the presence or absence of physical restraints; and (5) whether the individual was released at the end of the interview.)

State v. Montague, 2012-Ohio-4285 (8th Dist.) (In determining whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest, the court must “examine the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable person in the suspect’s position.”)

In re: R.S., 2014-Ohio-3543 (3rd Dist.) (“[A] juvenile’s age may be considered in the Miranda analysis, so long as the juvenile’s age was known to the officer at the time of questioning or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer. . . . While a juvenile’s age may be considered in the Miranda custody analysis, the Supreme Court cautioned that this does not mean that a child’s age will be a determinative, or even a significant, factor in every case.”)

State v. Johnson, 2016-Ohio-7266 (12th Dist.) (“The Due Process Clause requires an inquiry, separate from custody considerations, concerning whether a defendant’s will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of his confession.”)

In the matter of: D.B., 2018-Ohio-1247 (10th Dist.) (holding that factors suggesting no custodial interrogation include the interview being conducted at a social services station rather than police station, an unlocked room, and the juvenile leaves with a parent.)

State v. Jackson, 2018-Ohio-2169 (“[T]he Miranda requirements do not apply to admissions made to persons who are not officers of the law or their agents,” even if an individual’s efforts aid in law enforcement.)

 M.H.’s Argument

M.H.’s confession must be suppressed because his confession was involuntarily made, which violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights. Additionally, M.H.’s statements must be suppressed because he confessed to a law enforcement agent while in custody and without being advised of his Miranda rights.

For decades, the judiciary has recognized that juveniles need special protections distinct from adults. The juvenile justice system was born out of this recognition. A separate justice system is justified by the cognitive and psychological differences that exist between juveniles and adults. For example, juveniles typically have a limited understanding of the justice system and tend to make impulsive decisions. Additionally, children indisputably behave and perceive events differently than adults. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized these differences in a series of recent cases.

The Fifth Amendment requires that M.H.’s statements be suppressed because the statements were involuntarily made.  When a juvenile makes a confession, courts must ensure that the confession was voluntarily given. A voluntary confession is one that is not coerced, suggested, or the product of ignorance about rights or adolescent fantasy, fright, or despair.

To determine whether M.H.’s statements were voluntary, the Court must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. When examining the totality of the circumstances, four general presumptions about children must be accepted. First, juveniles are more susceptible to outside pressures than adults. Second, children often lack experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid potentially detrimental choices. Third, children are more likely to succumb to interrogation techniques by answering from a place of adolescent fantasy, fright, or despair. Fourth, the risk of false confession climbs significantly when a juvenile is the target of an interrogation. To show that a statement was voluntarily made, the government must overcome these presumptions. Here, the government did not do so.

The coerciveness of the interrogation is clear from the circumstances surrounding M.H.’s interrogation. M.H.’s age, his grade level, and his level of comprehension are critical considerations when determining whether the interrogation was coercive.  Given M.H.’s young age, he was developmentally at-risk to provide a self-incriminating statement involuntarily. Behavioral evidence from juvenile interrogation studies suggest that some adolescents falsely confess to a crime simply so that they will be allowed to go home. Additionally, adolescents are generally unequipped to endure the pressures of interrogation. As a young juvenile, M.H. was susceptible to the interrogation techniques utilized in the interview.

Moreover, children are naturally vulnerable to a parent’s expectations. M.H.’s mother drove him to the interview and told him to go with the social worker. Even if his mother never explicitly said so, her actions show that she implicitly expected M.H. to cooperate with the social worker and the interrogation. The difference in power between M.H. and his mother, combined with his mother’s expectations, resulted in subtle and psychological coercion that compelled M.H. to cooperate with the social worker. It is also unfair to put parents in this position.

The interrogation process itself is inherently coercive. Indeed, it is structured to capitalize on the power imbalance between the interrogator and suspect. This power imbalance is intensified when the suspect is a youth. Here, the social worker—herself a former homicide detective—conducted the interview consistent with police interrogation protocol.

In addition to M.H.’s age, other circumstances also demonstrate the coerciveness of the interrogation. The social worker did not inform M.H. of the purpose of the interview, that the interview was voluntary, or that the information learned from the interrogation might be shared with law enforcement. Also, M.H. was separated from his mother and did not have an attorney present. The interrogation occurred in a government building with armed security guards and metal detectors at the front door. Nothing in the record suggests that M.H. knew the difference between a CCDFS social worker and a police detective. Further, M.H. was not informed of his Miranda rights or that he was free to leave. His mother later testified that had she known the purpose and nature of the meeting she would have had a lawyer present.

Given all these circumstances, M.H. did not believe he was free to leave. The characteristics unique to the adolescent brain and psychosocial development make a juvenile’s perception of a restraint on his freedom fundamentally distinct from an adult’s perception of such a restraint. Plus, children tend to comply with authority figures.

Additionally, the social worker acted as an agent of law enforcement when she interviewed M.H. about the child sexual abuse allegation. A social worker is an agent of law enforcement when the social worker acts at the direction or under the control of law enforcement. In Ohio, a CCDCFS social worker is statutorily required to provide a report to law enforcement after investigating an allegation of abuse. Reciprocally, if an allegation of abuse is made to the police, the police are statutorily required to refer the allegation to an appropriate public children services agency.

These statutory requirements formalize and structure the investigatory relationship between CCDCFS and Cleveland Police. M.H. was interviewed by the CCDCFS agent under the direction and for the benefit of law enforcement. Due to the deep institutionalized relationship between the police and the CCDCFS, it is clear that the CCDCFS social worker was acting as an agent of law enforcement when she interviewed M.H. The recent decision in State v. Jackson, which was intensively fact-driven, is inapplicable here for three reasons. First, unlike Mr. Jackson, who was the thirty-year-old defendant, M.H. is a child, deserving of “special care” when determining whether police techniques were coercive. Second, the social worker in this case was far more entangled with law enforcement than in Jackson. The social worker here acted as law enforcement because she interviewed M.H., reported her findings to detectives, and was the “gatekeeper” in deciding to criminally charge M.H. Accordingly, an agency relationship existed between the social worker and law enforcement. Third, in Jackson, Mr. Jackson had previously been informed of his Miranda rights. In contrast, M.H. was never informed about any of his Constitutional rights.

Law enforcement use social workers as its agents to obtain information that they otherwise would not be able to obtain so freely. Here, the social worker initiated the interrogation to discover if M.H. had engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior, and then to provide a report to law enforcement. The detective assigned to the case admitted that she did not need to interview M.H. because the CCCDFS social worker had already done so. The only legitimate purpose for the social worker’s interview of M.H. in this case was to directly assist the investigation of law enforcement pursuant to Ohio law.

The power to arrest is considered a hallmark of who may be considered law enforcement for Miranda purposes. When investigating child sexual abuse, CCDCFS agents have the statutory authority to take custody of juveniles, with or without police assistance. Accordingly, the CCDCFS social worker wielded the coercive power to separate a child from his home. Based on all of these circumstances, M.H.’s statements to the social worker must be suppressed.

Even if the Court finds that M.H.’s statements were voluntarily made, the statements still must be suppressed because M.H. was not informed of his Miranda rights. Agents of law enforcement must provide Miranda warnings when interrogating an accused suspect who is held in custody. If the accused is not provided Miranda warnings, the accused’s statements may not be used as evidence against the accused.

M.H. was held in custody for Miranda purposes during his interrogation with the social worker. When determining whether a child was held in custody, the Court must examine the circumstances surrounding the child’s interrogation. Given those circumstances, the Court must determine whether a reasonable child would have felt free to terminate and leave the interrogation. In making this determination, age is certainly a relevant factor.

All the circumstances surrounding M.H.’s interrogation were coercive to the point that a reasonable child would not have felt free to leave the interrogation. In sum, his statements to the social worker must be suppressed.

State’s Argument

M.H.’s statements must not be suppressed because they were voluntarily made to a social worker. Additionally, no Miranda violation occurred because M.H. was not in custody when he made his confession and because the social worker was not an agent of law enforcement.

To show that M.H.’s statements were made involuntarily and in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights, M.H. must show that his will was overcome by the circumstances surrounding his interrogation. This inquiry is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant’s age, mentality, and prior criminal record. Additional considerations are the length, intensity, and frequency of the interrogation, whether the defendant was physically deprived or mistreated, and whether any threats or inducements were made.  

The circumstances of M.H.’s interrogation clearly indicate that any reasonable child in M.H.’s position would have felt free to leave the interrogation. M.H. was thirteen years old when the interview occurred. He was driven to the interview by his mother who was aware of the allegations about M.H. even before they arrived at the interview. The interview itself lasted forty minutes in an unlocked room. M.H. was never restrained and was always free to leave the interview at any time.

Further, no evidence in the record supports the argument that M.H. was ignorant of his rights, was coerced to give a statement, or was frightened by the social worker. The interview was not inherently coercive. No evidence suggests that M.H.—or any reasonable juvenile—would think that the social worker was a law enforcement officer. Based on the totality of the circumstances, M.H.’s statements clearly were voluntarily made to the social worker.

Additionally, no Miranda violation occurred. To establish a Miranda violation, the defendant must be both held in custody and interrogated by an agent of law enforcement.

M.H.’s third proposition of law is foreclosed by this Court’s recent decision in Jackson. Here, as there, the social worker was not an agent of law enforcement. The social worker in this case had a duty to investigate the allegations of rape and gross sexual imposition of a twelve-year-old child. She then had a statutory duty pursuant to R.C. 2151.421 to report any criminal findings to law enforcement. Complying with these statutory requirements did not transform her into an agent of law enforcement. Also, the statutory requirements do not create an “institutionalized relationship” between the police and the social worker. Rather, the statute imposed a duty on the social worker to comply with and provide information about child abuse investigations to law enforcement. This statute does not bring the social worker under the control of law enforcement, or mandate that the social worker interview at the direction of law enforcement.

Outside of the statutory obligations, there is no evidence that the CCDCFS social worker was working at the direction or under the control of Cleveland Police. Police were not present for the interview, did not request the social worker to conduct the interview, and did not provide questions for the social worker to ask. In fact, the detective assigned to the case did not learn about the interview until after it had occurred. Therefore, M.H.’s statements were not given to law enforcement or an agent of law enforcement. Accordingly, no Miranda warnings were required. 

Determining whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes is not always resolved by simply asking if the person is free to leave. Rather, custody specifies circumstances that present a serious danger of coercion.  Here, the social worker’s interview of M.H. was not coercive. No charges had been filed, M.H. was not under arrest, and no police were present at any time. The interview itself lasted for forty minutes and was conducted in a private, unlocked room with his mother nearby. M.H. was not physically restrained, and he never expressed reluctance or hesitation in answering the social worker’s questions. Lastly, there is no evidence of overt intimidation or coercion.

 While age is a legitimate factor when considering if M.H. was in custody, age by itself is not dispositive. A juvenile is not always in custody when a parent brings the juvenile to meet with a state actor. To require a Miranda warning, coercive facts—other than simply the age of the suspect—must be present. Because no coercive facts are present here, M.H. was not in custody for Miranda purposes.

The social worker’s prior training as a police officer is irrelevant and establishes nothing about her work’s purpose and function in this case. Because she lacked power to arrest when she interviewed M.H., the social worker was not a law enforcement officer required to administer a Miranda warning. Social workers may take juveniles into custody under limited circumstances, such as pursuant to a court order or as a duly authorized officer of the court, to prevent immediate harm. There is no plausible comparison between a police officer’s ability to arrest an individual in an interrogation with a social worker’s limited ability to take custody of children. Therefore, the social worker was not an agent of law enforcement and therefore had no obligation to provide Miranda warnings to M.H.

Amicus in Support of M.H.

Juvenile Law Center

The Juvenile Law Center (“JLC”) is a non-profit public interest law firm that advocates for rights, dignity, equity, and opportunity for youth. The JLC argues that children are developmentally and cognitively different from adults and especially susceptible to coercion and interrogation techniques. Consequently, procedural safeguards are critical to prevent state actors from unconstitutionally eliciting incriminating statements from youth. The JLC asserts that a child’s parents often do not adequately safeguard a child’s constitutional rights. Because M.H.’s mother did not adequately safeguard M.H.’s rights, the JLC requests the Court to suppress M.H.’s statements made to the social worker.

Amicus in Support of State

Ohio Attorney General

As Ohio’s chief law enforcement officer, the Attorney General has an interest in ensuring that Ohio social workers can protect families and children by conducting unencumbered investigations into allegations of child abuse. The Attorney General argues that the social worker in this case was not an agent of law enforcement because the police had no influence over the social worker’s questioning and had no contact with the social worker until after the interview. Thus, the social worker had no obligation to give Miranda warnings. Additionally, the Attorney General contends that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interview indicate that M.H. was not in custody when he spoke with the social worker.  Finally, the Attorney General asserts that no evidence exists to suggest that M.H. was coerced or threatened into confessing to the social worker. A contrary holding would result in making nearly every statement made by a juvenile during a custodial interrogation involuntary and barred under the Due Process Clause—a consequence which the Constitution does not require. The effect would be to make confessions inadmissible against juveniles, which the Constitution also does not require.

Ohio Attorney General’s Counter Proposition of Law 1

An individual’s age is irrelevant when determining whether a state actor is an agent of law enforcement; age is considered only when determining whether an interrogation was custodial.

Ohio Attorney General’s Counter Proposition of Law 2

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes no restrictions on the admission of statements unless those statements resulted from coercive police activity.

Student Contributor: Maria Ruwe