Update: On December 22, 2020 the Supreme Court of Ohio handed down a merit decision in this case.  Read the analysis here.

Update: On May 1, 2020, after the case was argued, the Court requested additional briefing from the parties in this case. Read about that here.

On April 28, 2020, the Supreme Court of Ohio will hear oral argument in State of Ohio v. Kyle Patrick, 2019-0655. At issue in this case is whether the Eighth Amendment and the Ohio Constitution require a trial court to consider a juvenile offender’s age before imposing a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.

Case Background

Kyle Patrick was charged with aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, tampering with evidence, and two firearm specifications. Patrick was initially charged in the Mahoning County Juvenile Court because he was 17 years old at the time of the offense. However, on August 24, 2012, the juvenile court transferred the matter to the general division.

On February 10, 2014, Patrick entered a guilty plea but then attempted to withdraw it on February 18, 2014. Judge John M. Durkin of the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas denied Patrick’s motion to withdraw the plea, but the Seventh District Court of Appeals reversed. Patrick’s plea was vacated, and he proceeded to trial. At trial, the jury convicted Patrick on all counts. Judge Durkin sentenced Patrick to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after thirty-three years.

Patrick appealed, arguing that it was unconstitutional for the trial court to sentence him to life imprisonment without taking into consideration that he was a juvenile at the time the offenses occurred.

The Appeal

In a unanimous decision authored by Judge Gene Donofrio, joined by Judges Cheryl L. Waite and David A. D’Apolito, the Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

The Seventh District found that the sentence imposed by the trial court was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law because each of Patrick’s sentences complied with the applicable statute. Additionally, the Seventh District concluded that, pursuant to R.C. 2929.12, a trial court is not required to consider the age of a defendant when issuing a felony sentence.

Votes to Accept the Case

Yes: Chief Justice O’Connor and Justices French, Donnelly, and Fischer.

No: Justices Kennedy, DeWine, and Stewart

Patrick’s First Proposition of Law Accepted for Review

Imposition of any life imprisonment sentence upon a juvenile offender without taking into consideration factors commanded by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of Ohio violates these provisions.

Patrick’s Second Proposition of Law Not Accepted for Review

It is a denial of due process a denial of the right to trial by jury to invade the province of the jury’s fact-finding charge by refusing to give a lesser included instruction, thereby giving the jury the option only to convict on the indicted offense or to acquit.

State’s Response to Patrick’s First Proposition of Law

The Eighth Amendment and the Ohio Constitution do not require a trial court to explicitly consider, on the record, a juvenile offender’s age if his sentence affords him the opportunity for parole.

Key Statutes and Precedent

U.S. Const. Amend. VIII (Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.)

Ohio Const. Art. I, § 9 (Excessive bail shall not be required; nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.)

R.C. 2929.03(A)(1)(a)-(d) (Aggravated murder is an unclassified felony that carries a possible prison sentence of life imprisonment without parole or life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 20 years, 25 years, or 30 years.)

R.C. 2929.11(A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the offender.)

R.C. 2929.12 (A trial court is not required to consider the age of a defendant when issuing a felony sentence.)

R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b) (Tampering with evidence is a third-degree felony which carries a possible prison sentence of 9, 12, 18, 24, 30 or 36 months.)

R.C. 2941.145(A) (Mandatory three-year sentence for firearm specification.)

R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) (A sentence imposed for aggravated murder or murder pursuant to sections 2929.02 to 2929.06 of the Revised Code is not subject to review under this section.)

Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (The imposition of the death penalty on a 16-year old convicted of a homicide offense is unconstitutional.)

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments bar the imposition of the death penalty on offenders who are under the age of 18 when the offenses were committed.)

State v. Porterfield, 2005-Ohio-3095 (R.C. 2953.08(D) precludes review of individual murder sentences imposed pursuant to R.C. 2929.02 through 2929.06.)

Graham v. Florida, 460 U.S. 48 (2010) (The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile non-homicide offender.)

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Forbids imposition of mandatory life without parole sentences for all juvenile offenders.)

State v. Long, 2014-Ohio-849 (In exercising its discretion under R.C. 2929.03(A), a court must separately consider the youth of a juvenile offender as a mitigating factor before imposing a life sentence without parole and the record must reflect that the court specifically considered the juvenile offender’s youth as a mitigating factor at sentencing.)

State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002 (When reviewing a felony sentence, an appellate court must uphold the sentence unless the evidence clearly and convincingly does not support the trial court’s findings under the applicable sentencing statutes or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.)

State v. Moore, 2016-Ohio-8288 (A term of years so long as to be a de facto life without parole sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because it denies a juvenile a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.)

Patrick’s Argument

The trial court’s decision to sentence Patrick to life in prison with no meaningful opportunity for parole without considering Patrick’s youth and potential for change violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution.

A judge sentencing a juvenile offender tried as an adult is required to consider the juvenile’s lessened moral and mental development and increased likelihood of rehabilitation. Here, the trial court sentenced Patrick under R.C. 2929.02 and R.C. 2929.03 without considering Patrick’s youth at the time of the offense. The Seventh District held that the trial judge was not required to consider Patrick’s age when imposing a sentence. However, this holding disregards fifteen years of jurisprudence concerning the sentencing of juvenile offenders when tried as adults for serious offenses. Although neither R.C. 2929.02 nor R.C. 2929.03 mandates consideration of a defendant’s age, the Constitution requires a trial court to consider the defendant’s age when the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the offense. The Seventh District failed to consider fully the Eighth Amendment and its impact on R.C. 2929.02 and R.C. 2929.03.

Under the Eighth Amendment, advances in knowledge regarding juvenile development must be applied to sentencing so that sentencing reflects the evolving standards of decency that characterize the progress of a maturing society.

The State argues that trial courts are not required to consider a juvenile offender’s age prior to imposing a sentence unless the court intends to impose a life-without-parole sentence. This argument is both circular and incorrect. Both juveniles sentenced to life without parole and juveniles sentenced to a term of years are entitled to have mitigating evidence considered.

Both the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court have established an Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that reflects society’s evolving understanding of juvenile emotional and character development. However, in sentencing Patrick, the trial court ignored this jurisprudence.

Society’s enhanced understanding of juvenile emotional and character development has altered the criminal justice system’s treatment of juveniles. In Roper v. Simmons, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court concluded that a juvenile’s criminal conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult for the same reasons that society does not trust juveniles with all of the privileges and responsibilities of an adult. The Court also reasoned that the death penalty does not effectively deter juveniles because juveniles are less likely to engage in careful cost-benefit analyses.

In Roper, the Court also identified three general differences between juveniles and adults which demonstrate that juvenile offenders generally should not be classified as among the worst offenders: 1) a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility; 2) a greater vulnerability and susceptibility to negative influences and outside pressures; and 3) an undeveloped character and transitory personality traits. The Court also noted that juveniles lack control over their immediate surroundings and, thus, should be more readily forgiven for failing to escape negative environmental influences. The trial court overlooked all of these fundamental differences between juvenile and adult offenders when sentencing Patrick.

The Supreme Court in Roper observed that it is difficult to differentiate between juvenile offenders whose crimes are a result of their temporary immaturity and those whose crimes are a result of a permanently depraved moral character. Although the juvenile offender in Roper received the death penalty, the Court’s analysis applies with equal force to a juvenile offender, like Patrick, who has been sentenced to life in prison. However, an attempt to differentiate between these two types of juvenile offenders was not even attempted by the trial court in this case.

In Graham v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court prohibited the imposition of life-without-parole sentences for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses. Similarly, this Court has held that a term of years so long as to be a de facto life without parole sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because it denies juvenile offenders a meaningful opportunity to obtain release. The Supreme Court in Graham explained that the concept of proportionality is at the core of the Eighth Amendment. Although Patrick was convicted of a homicide offense, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Graham applies equally to the life sentence the trial court imposed on Patrick.

In Miller v. Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court also prohibited the mandatory imposition of life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders. The Court reasoned that this mandatory sentencing scheme prevents courts from considering a juvenile offender’s diminished culpability and greater capacity for change when determining the juvenile offender’s sentence.

In all life sentence cases, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require the trial court to consider the juvenile offender’s youth and potential for change. The unique features of youth are not crime-specific and are not ameliorated simply because the trial court imposes a life sentence with an opportunity for parole. An opportunity for discretionary parole is not an adequate substitute for individualized sentencing. Patrick may never receive parole regardless of his behavior in prison. As a result, Patrick’s sentence is just as serious as life without parole because, at the time of sentencing, there is no meaningful way to distinguish between the two.

Regardless of whether Patrick receives parole, the trial court did not consider Patrick’s age in determining the length of his sentence. A trial court cannot evade its duty under the Eighth Amendment to consider a juvenile offender’s youth by imposing a slightly lesser sentence than life without parole. Here, there is no evidence in the record that the trial judge considered Patrick’s youth and potential for rehabilitation and change. Imposition of a sentence without such consideration violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Thus, Patrick was denied due process and his sentence was cruel and unusual.

While concededly not raised as a proposition of law, Patrick was also denied effective assistance of counsel at sentencing in this case. Applying the two-part Strickland test, Patrick’s counsel was obligated to bring evidence of Patrick’s youth and potential for change to the trial judge’s attention and failed to do so. As a result, Patrick was sentenced as an adult offender, without any consideration of youth as a mitigating factor, resulting in prejudice.

A trial court’s record must affirmatively reflect that the court considered youth as a mitigating factor in sentencing a juvenile offender to life in prison. There is no evidence of such consideration here. In fact, the record indicates that the trial court ignored Patrick’s youth and relied on the senselessness of the crime as the only sentencing factor.

State’s Argument

Patrick’s thirty-three-years-to-life sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law because neither the Eighth Amendment nor the Ohio Constitution require a trial court explicitly to consider, on the record, a juvenile offender’s age at sentencing unless the court imposes life without parole.

As an antecedent matter, pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(3), this Court is prohibited from reviewing Patrick’s life sentence for aggravated murder. R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) precludes review of individual murder sentences imposed under R.C. 2929.02 to 2929.06. Thus, Patrick’s sentence for aggravated murder is unreviewable and this Court’s review need not proceed any further.

Ohio’s felony sentencing scheme grants sentencing courts broad discretion to impose definite sentences for the vast majority of offenses based on the statutory range provided for the felony level charged. The trial court, rather than the parole board, then determines whether an offender sentenced to a definite term is entitled to early release. R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 were enacted to guide trial courts in imposing appropriate sentences. These statutes are general guidance statutes that do not require trial courts to engage in judicial fact finding. Trial courts are merely required to consider the statutory factors. As such, trial courts are afforded full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range.

The criminal justice system’s treatment of juveniles has changed drastically in the past fifteen years because the courts have come to understand that juveniles are constitutionally different from adults for the purposes of sentencing. In Graham v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile convicted of a non-homicide offense. In State v. Moore, this Court applied Graham in Ohio and held that a term-of-years prison sentence that exceeds a juvenile, non-homicide offender’s life expectancy violates the Eighth Amendment because it is the functional equivalent of a life-without-parole sentence. In Miller v. Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court required trial courts to consider an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics before imposing any particular sentence.  However, the U.S. Supreme Court later clarified that Miller does not require trial courts to state their findings of fact on the record. In State v. Long, this Court held that, in sentencing a juvenile for aggravated murder, a trial court must separately consider the juvenile offender’s youth as a mitigating factor before imposing a discretionary sentence of life without parole and the record must explicitly reflect that the trial court engaged in this consideration.

Ohio trial courts are not required explicitly to consider, on the record, a juvenile offender’s age at sentencing when the juvenile offender is afforded the possibility of parole. This Court’s holding in Long only applies to life-without-parole sentences. As such, Ohio trial courts are required explicitly to consider, on the record, a juvenile offender’s youth only before imposing a sentence of life without parole. Following Miller, Montgomery, and Long, Ohio appellate courts have consistently held that neither the Eighth Amendment nor Ohio’s felony-sentencing statutes require a trial court explicitly to consider the age of a juvenile offender on the record when imposing a sentence other than life without parole. Therefore, the Eighth Amendment violations outlined in Graham and Miller do not apply to Patrick. Thus, Patrick’s claim that his sentence is unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment is inapposite under these circumstances.

The concerns this Court expressed in Long regarding a juvenile offender’s diminished culpability and greater potential for rehabilitation do not exist here because Patrick has been afforded the possibility of parole depending on his maturity and amenability to rehabilitation. Additionally, other states do not require trial courts explicitly to consider, on the record, a juvenile offender’s age at sentencing unless the juvenile offender is sentenced to life without parole.

This Court, and Ohio appellate courts, have consistently held that a trial court is presumed to have implicitly considered the general felony-sentencing factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. These statutes already include both the nature of the offender and the possibility of the offender’s rehabilitation as factors for the court to consider in its sentencing deliberation. Moreover, this Court in Long rejected Patrick’s proposition that a trial court’s consideration of the factors outlined in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 must be explicitly stated on the record, holding that an offender’s youth may be considered under either of these provisions before the court imposes a sentence on a juvenile offender. Additionally, there is a distinction between a finding and a consideration. R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 do not require trial courts to engage in judicial fact-finding, but rather, only direct trial courts to consider the general felony-sentencing factors.

Although trial courts have a mandatory duty to consider the relevant statutory factors under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, a trial court is not required to evaluate each factor on the record or make specific findings prior to imposing a sentence. Therefore, given a silent record, a trial court must be presumed to have considered a juvenile offender’s youth prior to imposing a sentence. As such, Patrick’s thirty-three-years-to-life sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law because the trial court was not required to explicitly consider, on the record, Patrick’s age when imposing a sentence that affords him the possibility of parole.

Amici in Support of Patrick

Office of the Ohio Public Defender, Juvenile Law Center, et al.

The Office of the Ohio Public Defender, the Juvenile Law Center, the Central Juvenile Defender Center, the Children’s Law Center, the National Juvenile Defender Center, and the Schubert Center for Child Studies filed a joint brief in support of Patrick.

The Office of the Ohio Public Defender is a state agency designed to represent criminal defendants, adults, and juveniles, and to coordinate defense efforts throughout Ohio. The Juvenile Law Center is a non-profit public interest law firm that advocates for the rights, dignity, equity, and opportunity for youth in the child welfare and justice systems. The Central Juvenile Defender Center is a public interest organization that works to improve access to counsel and quality representation for youth in the juvenile justice system. The Children’s Law Center is a non-profit organization committed to the protection and enhancement of the legal rights of children. The Cuyahoga County Public Defender’s Office provides legal services to indigent adults and children charged with criminal violations. The National Juvenile Defender Center strives to ensure excellence in juvenile defense and to promote justice for all children. The Schubert Center for Child Studies is an academic center at Case Western Reserve University which bridges research, practice, policy, and education for the well-being of children and adolescents.

The Seventh District’s decision should be overturned because imposition of a life sentence upon a juvenile offender without taking into consideration youth as a mitigating factor is unconstitutional, even with the future possibility of discretionary parole. The future possibility of discretionary parole is not a substitute for individualized sentencing.  Additionally, the imposition of a sentence that denies a juvenile offender a meaningful opportunity for release constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

Amicus in Support of State

Ohio Attorney General

Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost (“Attorney General”) is interested in ensuring that Ohio’s juvenile sentencing structure is properly construed and applied and that Ohio’s Constitution is protected against misconstruction.

The Court should dismiss this appeal as improvidently accepted. This case implicates the question of whether there is jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a life sentence imposed for aggravated murder pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(3). However, Patrick has not addressed this jurisdictional question nor has this Court agreed to hear it. Otherwise, this case presents only the narrow question of whether a trial court must expressly consider a juvenile offender’s age on the record because the trial court presumably considered Patrick’s age implicitly during sentencing. Further, Patrick’s brief fails to present any argument addressing Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution and, thus, abandoned any arguments resting on that provision.

Alternatively, the Court should affirm the Seventh District’s decision because neither the Eighth Amendment nor Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution require trial courts to expressly consider a juvenile murderer’s age before sentencing him to life with the possibility of parole in thirty-three years. A court provides a juvenile offender with a meaningful opportunity for release when it sentences the juvenile offender to life with the possibility of parole after thirty-three years.

Attorney General’s Proposed Proposition of Law

A trial court does not violate the United States or Ohio constitutions when it imposes a sentence of life imprisonment, with the possibility of parole after thirty-three years, on a juvenile who committed a homicide offense—and that is true even if the court does not explicitly consider, on the record, the juvenile’s age.

Student Contributor: Madeline Pinto