Update: On April 14, 2020 the Supreme Court of Ohio handed down a merit decision in this case. Read the analysis here.

Read an analysis of the oral argument here.

On December 11, 2019, the Supreme Court of Ohio will hear oral argument in State of Ohio v. Shawn M. Miller, 2018-0948. At issue in this case is whether an appellate court must use a substantial compliance standard or a strict compliance standard when reviewing whether a defendant understood that a guilty plea waives certain constitutional rights. Tenth District Court of Appeals Judge Lisa L. Sadler will sit for Justice Stewart, who sat on the appellate decision in the case.

Case Background

Shawn M. Miller was initially charged with four counts of attempted murder, five counts of aggravated arson, one count of arson, five counts of felonious assault, and one count of breaking and entering. Miller accepted a plea bargain where he pled guilty to one count of aggravated arson, one count of arson, and one count of felonious assault, and the state dropped the remaining charges.

At Miller’s plea hearing, Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Judge Janet Burnside informed Miller of his constitutional trial rights, but never expressly told him that by pleading guilty he was waiving those rights. Judge Burnside found that Miller’s plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently, accepted the guilty pleas, and sentenced Miller to eight years in prison.  Miller appealed his convictions.

The Appeal

In a split decision written by Judge Eileen T. Gallagher, joined by Judge Kathleen Ann Keough, the Eighth District held that the trial court committed reversible error by accepting Miller’s guilty plea without asking Miller whether he understood that his guilty plea waived the constitutional rights enumerated in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).

The majority found that strict compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) is required to ensure that a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the constitutional rights enumerated in the rule. While the trial court adequately ensured that Miller understood what his constitutional rights were, the court failed to ensure that Miller understood that his guilty plea waived those rights. Because the trial court did not strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), the majority invalidated Miller’s plea and remanded the case.

Judge Melody J. Stewart dissented. She would hold that the trial court adequately complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) because a trial court is not required to use magic words to inform defendants that they are waiving their rights. In Miller’s case, the trial judge used language that she thought Miller would understand, which adequately complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).

Votes to Accept the Case

Yes: Justices Kennedy, Fischer, former Justice O’Donnell, and Franklin County Court of Appeals Court Judge Sadler*

No: Chief Justice O’Connor and Justices French and DeWine

*Judge Sadler replaced then-Justice DeGenaro in voting to accept the case, and is sitting for Justice Stewart on the appeal.

State’s Proposition of Law Accepted for Review

A reviewing court applies a substantial compliance standard in determining whether criminal defendants understand they are waiving their constitutional trial rights when entering a plea in a felony case.

Key Statutes and Precedent

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) (In felony cases, the court . . . shall not accept a plea of guilty . . . without first . . . determining that the defendant understands that by the plea, the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.”)

State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473 (1981) (“[T]he best method of informing a defendant of his constitutional rights is to use the language contained in Crim. R. 11(C), stopping after each right and asking the defendant whether he understands the right and knows that he is waiving it by pleading guilty.”)

State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525 (1996) (“When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.”)

State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176 (2008) (“A trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and orally advise a defendant before accepting a felony plea that the plea waives (1) the right to a jury trial, (2) the right to confront one’s accusers, (3) the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses, (4) the right to require the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and (5) the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. When a trial court fails to strictly comply with this duty, the defendant’s plea is invalid. (Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), applied.”)(Syllabus)

State v. Strebler, 2009-Ohio-1200 (7th Dist.) (“A trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and orally advise a defendant before accepting a felony plea that the plea waives certain constitutional rights.”)

State v. Ellis, 2015-Ohio-3438 (10th Dist.) (Appellate courts must use a substantial compliance standard of review when determining whether a defendant understood that a guilty plea waived certain constitutional rights.)

State’s  Argument

When determining whether criminal defendants understand that they are waiving certain constitutional rights by entering a guilty plea, trial courts must substantially comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).

A substantial compliance standard promotes the purpose of Crim.R. 11(C), which is to make sure that defendants make voluntary and informed decisions about whether to plead guilty. Also, common sense dictates that form should not control over substance. For example, a guilty plea dispenses with the need for constitutional trial rights because a defendant who pleads guilty does not receive a trial. Therefore, there is an implicit understanding that a guilty plea waives a defendant’s constitutional trial rights.

The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that a reviewing court should examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily understood the consequences of a guilty plea, using a substantial compliance standard of review. In Miller’s plea colloquy, the trial court did not use the specific words “waive” or “waiver.” However, a trial court does not need to use the exact language in Crim.R. 11 when ensuring that defendants understand that a guilty plea waives certain constitutional rights. In Miller’s case, the trial court informed Miller of the constitutional trial rights that he would have if he went to trial. Miller knew that his guilty plea was a complete admission of guilt and that he would not receive a trial if he pleaded guilty. Because there would be no trial, Miller understood that his guilty plea waived his constitutional trial rights. Therefore, the trial court meaningfully conveyed the substance of Miller’s rights, which substantially complies with Crim.R. 11(C).

Even if strict compliance were the applicable standard, the trial court met this standard as well. Strict compliance does not require rote recitation of the rule. Instead, the focus must be on whether the trial court offered an explanation in a way that was reasonably intelligible to the defendant.

Rather than focusing on a formalistic litany of constitutional rights, reviewing courts should focus on the substance of the dialogue between the trial court and the defendant to determine whether the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily decided to plead guilty. The trial court informed Miller about the rights he would have if he went to trial. Because Miller knew he would not receive a trial if he pleaded guilty, Miller fully understood that his guilty plea waived his trial rights. Therefore, the trial court both strictly and substantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C).

Miller’s Argument

When accepting a guilty plea in a felony case, a trial court must strictly comply with Crim. R. 11(C)(2)(c) when determining whether defendants understand that a guilty plea waives certain constitutional trial rights.

Crim. R. 11(C)(2)(c) requires that a trial court determine whether a defendant understands that a guilty plea waives certain constitutional rights. The trial court informed Miller about the nature of his constitutional rights but failed to ensure that Miller understood that his guilty plea waived those rights. By accepting Miller’s guilty plea without ensuring that Miller understood the consequences of his plea, the trial court committed reversible error.

A court should not simply assume that a layperson understands that a guilty plea waives certain constitutional trial rights. Unless Miller was explicitly asked if he understood the consequences of pleading guilty, a court may not assume that he understood the effect of his plea. Because the trial court made no such inquiry, the trial court could not have known whether Miller made his plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. The trial court did not strictly comply with Crim R. 11(C)(2)(c), which invalidates Miller’s guilty plea.

Even if the applicable standard were substantial compliance instead of strict compliance, the trial court also failed to meet this less stringent standard. The trial court failed to use not only the word “waive” anytime throughout Miller’s plea colloquy, but also failed to use any variant of the word. For example, the trial court did not use the terms “give up,” “forego,” “abandon,” “relinquish,” “bypass,” “surrender,” or any other synonym or variation of the term “waive.” Further, the court did not even roughly explain that Miller was waiving his constitutional rights in simple terms or ask Miller whether he understood the consequence of his guilty plea. The closest that the trial court came to explaining Miller’s waiver of rights was when the trial court told Miller that he was free to proceed to trial instead of accepting the plea bargain. This does not meet the substantial compliance standard. Because the trial court’s colloquy with Miller satisfied neither the strict nor the substantial compliance standard, Miller’s guilty plea should be invalidated.

Additionally, the State failed to preserve this argument for appeal because the State did not previously argue that substantial compliance was the correct standard. Initially, the State argued that the applicable standard is strict compliance. Generally, the Supreme Court of Ohio does not consider a claim of error that was not considered by the court below. Because the State argued that the relevant standard is strict compliance at the lower level and raises the argument of substantial compliance for the first time here, this Court should hold that the State’s argument that substantial compliance is the correct standard is waived.

There is a great deal at stake when defendants waive their constitutional rights. Given the seriousness of such a decision, this Court should not set a precedent that “close enough” is good enough when determining whether defendants understand the consequence of a guilty plea. When a trial court fails to strictly comply with the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), the trial court commits reversible error.

Student Contributor: Maria Ruwe