Update: On January 23, 2019, the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed this case as improvidently accepted.
On January 9, 2019, the Supreme Court of Ohio heard oral argument in the case of State of Ohio v. Ronald Amos, 2017-1778. At issue in the case is whether a juvenile court has jurisdiction to hold a classification review hearing after a juvenile has been discharged from parole. Judge Thomas J. Osowik of the Sixth District Court of Appeals sat for the recused Justice Fischer.
Case Background
On January 26, 2010, 14-year-old Ronald Amos was adjudicated a delinquent by the Hamilton County Juvenile Court for what would have been the offense of rape if committed by an adult, and committed to the Department of Youth Services (“DYS”). He was released from DYS on March 30, 2011, placed on parole, and classified as a Tier I juvenile-offender registrant. Amos was discharged from parole on June 24, 2013. Then, on July 2, 2014, over a year after Amos was discharged from parole, the juvenile court held a completion of disposition hearing in which the judge ordered that Amos’ initial Tier I classification was to remain in effect, thus continuing his requirement to register as a sex offender. Amos, who did not receive notice of the hearing, did not attend.
In April 2014, Amos was indicted and pled guilty to one count of failure to notify the sheriff of a change of address. Then in July 2015, Amos was again indicted for failure to provide notice of a change of address.
Amos filed a motion to dismiss the 2015 indictment on the ground that he had no duty to register because the juvenile court had no authority to classify him after his juvenile disposition and parole had ended. Hamilton County Common Pleas Court Judge Pat Foley agreed and granted his motion. Based on this finding, Amos subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the 2014 indictment also and to withdraw that guilty plea. This motion was also granted. The state appealed both orders dismissing the indictments. The two appeals were consolidated into one for review by the First District Court of Appeals.
The Appeal
In a split decision authored by Judge Penelope Cunningham, in which Judge Dennis Deters concurred, the First District Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the indictments. The appeals court agreed with the trial court that the indictments were properly dismissed. When Amos was discharged from parole, he had completed all aspects of the disposition for his sexually-oriented offense, which is when the juvenile court should have held the end-of-disposition hearing, not over a year later. Because the court failed to do so, it lacked the authority to classify Amos as a Tier I offender; thus Amos did not have a duty to register.
Judge Charles Miller dissented on the grounds that the timing of the review did not deprive the juvenile court of jurisdiction. In Judge Miller’s view, “once a juvenile court makes an appropriate classification under R.C. 2152.83, it is permanently vested with jurisdiction to review the classification in accordance with R.C. 2152.84 and 2152.85.”
Read the oral argument preview of the case here.
State’s Proposition of Law Accepted For Review
Once a juvenile court makes an appropriate classification under R.C. 2152.83, it is permanently vested with jurisdiction to review the classification in accordance with R.C. 2152.84 and 2153.85.
Key Precedent
Crim.R. 12(C)(2) (“…The following must be raised before trial: … (2) Defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment, information, or complaint (other than failure to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense, which objections shall be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the proceeding.”)
R.C. 2152.83(A)(1)(Initial juvenile tier-classification hearing shall take place at the time of disposition or release from a secure facility.)
R.C. 2152.83(B) (Governs the initial classification hearing: “The court…may conduct at the time of disposition of the child or…at the time of release from a secure facility a hearing…to determine whether the child should be classified as a juvenile-offender registrant.”)
R.C. 2152.83 (D) (Lists factors to be considered in determining whether to classify a delinquent child as a juvenile-offender registrant.)
R.C. 2152.83 (E) (“An order issued under division (A) or (B) of this section and any determinations included in the order shall remain in effect for the period of time specified in section 2950.07 of the Revised Code, subject to a modification or termination of the order under section 2152.84 of the Revised Code… The child’s attainment of eighteen or twenty-one years of age does not affect or terminate the order, and the order remains in effect for the period of time described in this division.”)
R.C. 2152.84 (A)(1) (End of disposition hearing) (Second classification hearing to determine whether initial classification should be ended, modified, or continued shall take place upon completion of disposition, including any probation or treatment.)
R.C. 2152.85 (B)(1) (Timeframe for petition for reclassification or declassification.)
R.C. 2950.07(B)(3) (If the person is a delinquent child who is a tier I sex offender/child-victim offender then the delinquent child’s duty to comply with those sections continues for ten years. If the judge who made the disposition for the delinquent child subsequently enters a determination pursuant to section 2152.84 or 2152.85 that the delinquent child no longer is to be classified a juvenile-offender registrant, the delinquent child’s duty to comply with those sections terminates upon the court’s entry of the determination.)
R.C. 2151.23(A)(15) (“The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction … To conduct the hearings…authorized or required under sections 2152.82 to 2152.86 and Chapter 2950. of the Revised Code…”)
In re Cross, 2002-Ohio-4183 (“when the court ended Cross’s probation, it ended its ability to make further dispositions as to Cross on that count.” The juvenile court loses jurisdiction over the juvenile after it releases him.)
State v. Payne, 2007-Ohio-4642 (A void judgment is subject to collateral attack at any time.)
State v. Palmer, 2012-Ohio-580 (The trial court is within its authority to dismiss an indictment “where the law simply does not apply” and “[w]ithout a doubt, an indictment is defective if it alleges violations of R.C. Chapter 2950 by a person who is not subject to that chapter.”)
State ex. rel Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch, 2012-Ohio-5697 (R.C. 2152.83 requires that the initial classification must occur when the child is released from a secure facility, not afterward.)
In Re CP, 2012-Ohio-1446 (striking down on cruel and unusual punishment grounds lifetime registration and notification requirement provision for certain juvenile sex offenders.)
State v. Dawson, 2013-Ohio-4074 (2nd Dist.)(“Even if the juvenile court erred by failing to hold the hearing at the time of disposition as statutorily required, the error is an error in exercising jurisdiction and cannot be collaterally attacked.”)
In re I.A., 2014-Ohio-3155 (Under 2152.84(A), a child classified as a juvenile-offender registrant under R.C. 2152.83 shall receive a mandatory hearing at the completion of the juvenile’s disposition regarding whether the classification continues to be appropriate.)
In re D.S., 2016-Ohio-1027 (It is not a due process violation to impose upon juvenile registration and notification requirements that extend beyond the age of 18 or 21.)
At Oral Argument
Arguing Counsel
Paula E. Adams, Assistant Hamilton County Prosecutor, for Appellant State of Ohio
Julie Kahrs Nessler, Assistant Hamilton County Public Defender for Appellee Ronald Amos
State’s Argument
The state seeks much needed clarification when it comes to the interplay between the general and juvenile divisions of the common pleas courts; more specifically, between a juvenile court’s sexually-oriented offender classification and corresponding registration requirements, and the general division’s later Crim. R. 12 dismissal of an indictment for a violation of those registration requirements. Clarification is needed because the juvenile division’s statutes regarding classification are unique and substantially different from that of the general division’s.
In the context of an initial classification, in State v. Palmer, this Court held that dismissal of an indictment is appropriate when the law simply doesn’t apply. But Palmer is not good precedent in this case, because it did not involve the unique aspects of juvenile classifications, which the common pleas court judge here seemed not to appreciate, and because Mr. Amos never appealed his classification.
While Mr. Amos did file a direct appeal with regard to his juvenile adjudication, he never appealed his classification. Specifically, Mr. Amos did not appeal the classification after the initial hearing, nor did he appeal after the mandatory review hearing. Those were the opportunities for him to challenge his classification. Instead, we have a trial court in the general division essentially engaging in a complicated appellate review of something that occurred in the juvenile division, by way of a Crim. R. 12 motion to dismiss. The issue here is the timing of that later mandatory classification review hearing. However, under Dawson, the time to attack that was through a direct appeal, not a Crim.R. 12 motion. The lower courts should have applied Dawson, not Palmer, and the incorrect application of Palmer has sent this case far off course.
Even though Mr. Amos has now reached the age of 21, pursuant to R.C. 2152.85, he still has the ability to get his juvenile classification before the appropriate court that has the entire record and the court that has the jurisdiction to consider it.
Finally, the meaning of the “upon completion of disposition” language in the statute is not as clear and straightforward as the defense argues. Mr. Amos, for example, did a stint in DYS, was paroled to a different jurisdiction for certain services and then crossed into another jurisdiction for other services, so what moment constitutes his “upon completion of disposition”? It’s the state’s position that the juvenile court has the ability to hold that “upon completion of disposition” hearing beyond the age of 21, under certain circumstances.
The majority decision from the First District should be reversed.
Amos’ Argument
As a threshold matter the state has forfeited appellate review of all the arguments made to the Court in oral argument. The only proposition of law accepted by this Court was whether juvenile court is vested with permanent jurisdiction once an initial classification is properly imposed by the juvenile court. Nothing at all was accepted about the Crim.R. 12 arguments. Whether R.C. 2950 applies to a particular person is exactly the type of issue to be resolved by a Crim. R. 12 motion, so even if the Court were to reach the merits of forfeited arguments, the state’s position must fail.
As for the state’s assertion that Mr. Amos acted inappropriately because he did not directly appeal from the second classification hearing, he never received notice of the fact that the juvenile court had continued his classification. Not only was he not notified of that hearing, but the juvenile court did not comply with the mandatory statutory requirements, nor consider the mandatory factors, nor was the hearing held at a proper time. Those factors implicate the juvenile court’s subject matter jurisdiction and would allow Mr. Amos to collaterally attack that decision at any time.
Under the juvenile rules, a juvenile is classified not only by the offense that is committed, but by the juvenile court exercising its discretion. While the entries in the case suggest that the initial Tier I classification was by agreement, that was only as to the R.C. 2152.83 classification, which does not last forever as the state argues. But the only challenge the state has made here that is properly before the Court is the timing of the R.C. 2152.84 end of disposition hearing. The state argues that hearing is flexible, and should occur “around the time” the disposition is complete. But that interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the statute. This Court has said that undefined terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. “Upon” has one meaning. It’s a more formal term for “on” or “at”. For youth like Ronald Amos who are committed to DYS, that disposition terminates when they are discharged from parole. It is not an issue of their age, specifically, although it can be, because upon reaching 21, that is the last date a youth can be under DYS control. In this case, the hearing should have been on June 24, 2013, the day Ronald was discharged from parole.
Even if this Court were to accept the state’s proposition that “upon completion of disposition” is some sort of flexible requirement and allows a reasonable time or a short interval, 13 months is simply not appropriate and would be outside the bounds of R.C. 2152.84.
The juvenile court completed no review whatsoever at that July 2014 hearing that was held without Mr. Amos. The court did not say that Mr. Amos had not been rehabilitated, or that juvenile treatment had not been successful and that Mr. Amos still remained a threat to society. The entry simply says that Mr. Amos was not present and his obligation is being continued. That’s not what’s allowed under the statute.
The legislature was very specific about why those hearings must occur upon the completion of the disposition. Up to that point, the juvenile court still has that tether, that connection and control to that juvenile—the court has tabs on him, knows what is going on. The court can ensure that the youth undergo sex offender evaluations, can get him into court, and can have that required hearing that the legislature found was so important to act as a safeguard to ensure that this penalty is only for those youth for whom it is appropriate.
Juvenile courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The timing requirements of these classification statutes are jurisdictional and limit the court’s authority to act. The decision of the court of appeals majority should be affirmed.
What Was On Their Minds
Waiver By The State
Justice DeWine really pressed the prosecutor about what the state had actually raised both in the trial court and the appeals court, and what was waived. He asked whether the case should be dismissed as improvidently accepted, and whether the Court should wait until all of the issues the state was raising were properly before the Court. He later asked defense counsel if the state was correct that if Amos had received notice of the fact that juvenile court had continued his classification, he would have been required to appeal at that time, and this would be res judicata. Is this case just a one-off, he asked? Or doesn’t it matter if Amos received notice or not? And even if the Court were to agree with the state about the .84 hearing, wouldn’t the other findings by the common pleas court about lack of service, notice and a full hearing remain in effect, as those haven’t been challenged on appeal?
Justice French allowed as how she also was very confused, noting that in the appeals court the state argued that the trial court didn’t have authority to second guess the juvenile court’s classification, but was arguing at oral argument that the juvenile court’s classification order was appropriate and that the lower court erred by holding otherwise. She asked in several different ways whether what the state was arguing was consistent with what it had argued below. She suggested that the state had forfeited the argument it was making at oral argument because it wasn’t raised in the trial court. She also asked whether the state argued about permanent jurisdiction in the court of appeals.
Classification Hearings
Didn’t Mr. Amos agree to his initial classification, asked Judge Osowik?
How many hearings, dispositions is this juvenile entitled to, asked Chief Justice O’Connor? Since the registration requirement was for 10 years, could the juvenile court have held a hearing any time within those 10 years for a modification of his classification or duty? Yet, a year after Amos was discharged from supervision, and without him present, that is when he had the completion of the disposition hearing? With no change in his obligations?
“Upon Completion of Disposition”
Is that when he walks out the door, when his probation or parole is up, or automatically when he turns 21, asked Chief Justice O’Connor? Does he get another hearing at 21?
How it Looks From The Bleachers
To Professor Emerita Bettman
Like a win for Amos. I completely agree with my student contributor Ivy Charneski that the state’s argument was very hard to follow and never seemed to get untracked. Most of the questions were about waiver. Granted, the matter is complicated, but I think the Court is going to find waiver of all but the timing of the mandatory classification review hearing.
Ultimately, I think a majority will reject the state’s position of permanent jurisdiction after an initial classification and go with Amos’ position that for jurisdiction and the initial classification to continue, the mandatory review hearing must take place upon completion of disposition. While that will differ in different cases, in this case, I think the Court will find that should have been when Amos was discharged from parole in June of 2013, not nearly a year later, and in his absence. Even if the Court were to allow some flexibility in the interpretation of “upon completion of disposition,” I think a majority will find that a classification review hearing more than a year after completion of Amos’ discharge from parole was too long and was unacceptable.
To Student Contributor Ivy Charneski
I found the State’s argument hard to follow and I also sensed some confusion from the bench. The prosecutor began the argument by vaguely framing the issue as a need for clarification on the interplay between the general and juvenile courts. Justices DeWine and French seemed skeptical of whether the State had waived its arguments. Justice DeWine asked about what was argued at the trial court, while Justice French focused on what happened in the First District. Chief Justice O’Connor wanted to know the State’s position on exactly when the mandatory hearing should have been held. In response, the prosecutor said that it was unclear from the statute. I think this was a crucial missed moment for the State because when the mandatory hearing is supposed to take place is the crux of this case, so for the State to answer that the statute is unclear is just a restatement of the issue.
The Chief Justice asked the defense the same central question about timing. In response, Amos’ attorney more clearly summed up Amos’ position by explaining that “upon” is simply a more formal word for “at” or “on”, and thus the mandatory review hearing should occur on the day the youth is discharged from parole. Amos’ attorney explained that the mandatory review hearing happens at discharge because the juvenile court still has a tie with the youth and is still “keeping tabs” on the youth at that point. I found it particularly compelling when Amos’ attorney pointed out that the continuation of the juvenile sex offender classification is only meant to be imposed on the juveniles for whom rehabilitation has not been effective. She described the mandatory review hearing as a safeguard to ensure that the classification is only imposed on unrehabilitated juveniles, not all juveniles. Despite having a sharper answer to the central question, I don’t know if the justices were persuaded.
Ultimately, the justices seemed to focus on two issues: 1) whether or not the State has waived its arguments; and 2) when the mandatory review hearing should be held. On the second point I think the court was thinking ahead to how it would craft a rule addressing the timing issue. However, I don’t think the justices were fully satisfied by the solutions heard on either side. Because of the confusion I sensed from the bench and the difficulty the justices seemed to be having in trying to articulate a solution, I think the court will affirm the lower courts’ decisions.